Speaker 1: Welcome to add Lots. I'm Tracy Alloway, Executive editor of
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Markets, and I'm Joey isn't All, Managing editor of
Speaker 1: Bloomberg Markets. Joe, I am so glad to have you back.
Speaker 1: It's great to be back, Tracy. I'm so this is
Speaker 1: where I'm naturally most comfortable chatting with you about issues
Speaker 1: and market nikon and finance. So glad to be back
Speaker 1: on on lot with you. Ah. Well, that's nice. Um,
Speaker 1: I's gonna say, I'm glad that you're back today, specifically
Speaker 1: because I think we have a show that you're going
Speaker 1: to be really interested in. Yes, because I know that
Speaker 1: you like the intersection of markets and finance and politics
Speaker 1: and sort of public mood, and boy are those the
Speaker 1: topics of discussion for today. You know, you edit a
Speaker 1: lot of the stuff I write, and I try to
Speaker 1: try to bring in politics and public stories all the time.
Speaker 1: So anything that hits at all those stuff, I like.
Speaker 1: So what are we gonna talk about? All? Right? Up
Speaker 1: for today, we have two of Bloomberg's finest journalists. We've
Speaker 1: got Omar I'm going to mispronounce us Valdemarsson and Edward Robinson,
Speaker 1: and they have just written a great story about Iceland,
Speaker 1: which you might know as the tiny, sort of frozen
Speaker 1: island country in the Atlantic. But it's also special because
Speaker 1: it's the only place that has actually sent any bankers,
Speaker 1: high level bankers to prison. I've been to Iceland. It's
Speaker 1: a beautiful country. They have the best hot dogs in
Speaker 1: the world. And as you know that, not only have
Speaker 1: they did they send bankers to prison after the economic crisis.
Speaker 1: It's one of these The icelandic financial story is one
Speaker 1: of these stories that just kind of goes on forever
Speaker 1: every once in a while, popping back into the news.
Speaker 1: And as we you said in the beginning, it's fascinating
Speaker 1: because it, you know, it's this tiny country, just over
Speaker 1: three thousand people. It's kind of it's an exaggeration, but
Speaker 1: not much. Everyone's of knows each other, and so it's
Speaker 1: been fascinating to see this tiny country deal with the
Speaker 1: you know, they had to deal with the post crisis era,
Speaker 1: and there's been a lot of interesting twists and turns
Speaker 1: along the way. So they had a massive banking crisis,
Speaker 1: a massive financial crisis, and now they are still years
Speaker 1: later dealing with the aftermath. And to your point, Joe
Speaker 1: this week, and I should say we're recording this slightly early,
Speaker 1: so things could change. Um. But this week we saw
Speaker 1: Iceland kind of shooting to the headlines again because of
Speaker 1: one thing, and that is the Panama papers. Right. It's
Speaker 1: prime minister, according to these League documents, had connections to
Speaker 1: an offshore fund where he may have had investments in
Speaker 1: some of these collapsed banks, and that led to gigantic
Speaker 1: protests in the country and ultimately led him to leave
Speaker 1: his post and another turn in the political turmoil. They're right,
Speaker 1: and there is a thought here that you could make
Speaker 1: or theory. I should say that a lot of the
Speaker 1: anger we've seen this week at the Prime minister in
Speaker 1: the Icelandic government is a sort of continuation of the
Speaker 1: outrage we saw in the aftermath of the crisis. Right. So,
Speaker 1: there's this gigantic banking bubble for a while everyone in
Speaker 1: Iceland seemed to get wildly rich off of it, and
Speaker 1: then when everything collapsed, and we'll talk about that, there
Speaker 1: was a lot of frustration at the elites, both in
Speaker 1: government and banking for essentially taking the country on this
Speaker 1: very risky ride that not only damage the economy but essentially,
Speaker 1: you know, damage the fabric of society as a whole. Okay, well,
Speaker 1: let's catch up with Bloomberg's Omar Valdemarson first. Uh, he's
Speaker 1: actually in Iceland, although I think he's driving in his
Speaker 1: car at the moment, so the sound quality might not
Speaker 1: be that great, but I'll leave that to our producers
Speaker 1: to fix. You've obviously been on the ground in Iceland
Speaker 1: for a long time. Tell us exactly what happened here,
Speaker 1: I guess. I guess it all begins with the privatization
Speaker 1: of Iceland's banks in the early two thousands in the Natings,
Speaker 1: I guess the Iceland the government decided to privatize two
Speaker 1: of its of its state run banks and basically at
Speaker 1: the time it was sold to political friends of the
Speaker 1: two coalition parties, which coincidentally are the same coalition parties
Speaker 1: that are in government today. Those banks then utilized the
Speaker 1: good credit rating of Iceland because these were primary previously
Speaker 1: state down bank and then they still had triple A
Speaker 1: rating with all the rating companies when they became privately
Speaker 1: held and went on a borrowing spree all over the world.
Speaker 1: And what they eventually did is cumulated so much that
Speaker 1: that their balanced seats were ten times the size of
Speaker 1: Iceland's economy. That's an yeah. And a lot of the uh,
Speaker 1: you know, a lot of the money that they bottled
Speaker 1: were you know, short term loans which were then lent
Speaker 1: to their clients over the long term. More than anything,
Speaker 1: what happened to these banks when they finally collapsed. The
Speaker 1: short explanation is that they ran out of short term funting.
Speaker 1: But the long term, long term explanation is obviously that
Speaker 1: there have been so much cross landing with these banks
Speaker 1: that they wouldn't have been able to survive, although they
Speaker 1: would have maybe passed this hurdle that they came across
Speaker 1: in October two eight. So it's sounds, you know, the
Speaker 1: story sounds pretty typical. Bank goes out with it has
Speaker 1: a good credit rating, borrows like crazy, does a lot
Speaker 1: of aggressive lending. Did they did? People convinced themselves that
Speaker 1: there was something expec show going on here that Iceland
Speaker 1: had like cracked the code to better banking, Like why
Speaker 1: didn't people realize that it was? The story was this simple? No,
Speaker 1: it was quite extraordinary to you know, in hindsight. Obviously
Speaker 1: I was suckered into it as well, just like pretty
Speaker 1: much all the all of the Icelantic population into believing
Speaker 1: that there was something special in the way that Icelandic
Speaker 1: people did business, that we weren't too concerned about the
Speaker 1: red tape, that decisions were taken at a faster pace,
Speaker 1: they were here than in other countries, or or or
Speaker 1: like our surrounding countries, or the countries that we often
Speaker 1: compare ourselves with, like the Scandinavian countries, and this made
Speaker 1: us better enough to make business decisions and seize opportunities
Speaker 1: when other people might be caught up in you know,
Speaker 1: trying to calculate the deal towards the end before before
Speaker 1: actually jumping in. And there were there were even you know,
Speaker 1: the Icelandic president, who was still the president at the time,
Speaker 1: was still the president now held speeches that with investors
Speaker 1: all over the world, telling them that this was a
Speaker 1: part of the Icelandic liking spirit. Then all that kind
Speaker 1: of hyped up language that basically facilitate that belief here
Speaker 1: that there was something special about us. Let's dwell on
Speaker 1: the Icelandic exceptionalism for a moment, because it was truly
Speaker 1: amazing how different Icelandic banks were perceived at the time
Speaker 1: and what they did actually. So if you look for instance,
Speaker 1: at the growth rate of Icelandic banks between two thousand
Speaker 1: four and two thousand five, they were growing at something
Speaker 1: like fifty one to thirty six percent a year, far
Speaker 1: outpacing any other Nordic bank. Why didn't that raise flags
Speaker 1: for anyone? Well, it for for the average joe in Iceland,
Speaker 1: it obviously didn't didn't raist a lot of flags. But
Speaker 1: we we started seeing some criticism. The most vocal one
Speaker 1: came from an economist named Las Christmas and who was
Speaker 1: then the head of emerging markets that they had the
Speaker 1: economist that for emerging markets at dance Kbank, and he
Speaker 1: was pretty much just executed in Iceland in the public
Speaker 1: debate for being uh for being jealous of the successes
Speaker 1: of of of Icelandic business people and the Icelantic banks.
Speaker 1: And we all wrote it down to, you know, the
Speaker 1: former colonial rulers being envious of iceland successes now that
Speaker 1: it was an independent country. Iceland banks were growing at
Speaker 1: a phenomenal pace in the sort of early mid two
Speaker 1: thousand's and that growth ended up having a lot of
Speaker 1: impact on countries other than Iceland. And for those of
Speaker 1: us who are living in the UK at the time,
Speaker 1: you know, we can remember all the ads from banks
Speaker 1: like helpting about high rate deposit accounts. Lots of councils
Speaker 1: in the UK, put money in Iceland, lots of depositors
Speaker 1: and they were all affected by the collapse of the banks.
Speaker 1: Would in bureaucracy by moving faster, being flexible, building clients,
Speaker 1: businesses and their own and have fun doing it. Where
Speaker 1: what is help thinking? It's help thinking is beyond normal thinking.
Speaker 1: To show up their to show up their portfolios. These
Speaker 1: banks went on a on a on a borrowing spree
Speaker 1: from depositors in the UK and in the Netherlands and
Speaker 1: in more countries. Cope Thing set up accounts they called
Speaker 1: Edge and land spunkies Lands set up accounts called ice safe.
Speaker 1: When these banks failed, the crypt Think was more successful
Speaker 1: and and and recompensating the depositors, while land Sparking found
Speaker 1: itself in a bit of a pickle. Land wasn't able
Speaker 1: to do that immediately, which resulted in the UK using
Speaker 1: legislation was which was meant to be used to tackle
Speaker 1: terrorist activities and put land Sparking on a list of
Speaker 1: terrorist organizations, froze the assets of both land Sparky hand
Speaker 1: cuype Think. In the UK, and this resulted in a
Speaker 1: huge international dispute between Iceland and the Netherlands and the UK. UM.
Speaker 1: That dispute eventually found its way to the after courts.
Speaker 1: The UK and the Netherlands maintained that Iceland was was
Speaker 1: meant to cover the shortfall of the bank to the
Speaker 1: psitors up to the minimum guarantee, which was euros in
Speaker 1: in the U in both cases. But the fter court
Speaker 1: then finally found that that Iceland was right. It didn't
Speaker 1: have to show up the accounts of Lance Punky, that
Speaker 1: only the bank itself was aliable for recompensating depositors, and
Speaker 1: through the liquidation of ascets that has finally happened, so
Speaker 1: only depositors were eventually paid in full. Um. So let's
Speaker 1: fast forward a little bit the economy. The banks collapsed
Speaker 1: as people probably should have seen coming um because they
Speaker 1: borrowed so much. How did the aftermath like, what did
Speaker 1: Iceland do in the wake of the bank collapse? Um?
Speaker 1: It was, Well, what we did was basically what we
Speaker 1: were forced to do. The the trushery wasn't wasn't Andy
Speaker 1: were close to being an understanding that could have salvaged
Speaker 1: the bank or or or or assisted them like in
Speaker 1: some of the other countries like Ireland. So what way,
Speaker 1: what the government did was, you know, a frantic move
Speaker 1: which took out all the domestic assets of the failed
Speaker 1: lenders and siphoned them into new new banks, which they created,
Speaker 1: new state created banks. And this was just on overnight,
Speaker 1: so the payment system was up and running. You have
Speaker 1: to understand it. In Iceland, almost nobody uses cash here.
Speaker 1: People use payment cards would either a bit or credit cards.
Speaker 1: For everything they buy, even something that's at a cost
Speaker 1: of less than a dollar, they used their payment cards.
Speaker 1: So maintaining the payment system was absolutely crucial. There were
Speaker 1: obviously riots in the streets that at the time when
Speaker 1: the banks were collapsing, and if people wouldn't have had
Speaker 1: access to their bank accounts via their payment cards, that
Speaker 1: that could have gone pretty nasty, pretty pretty fast. So
Speaker 1: they that they created these new state created banks and
Speaker 1: they put the the the the old banks with the
Speaker 1: foreign assets into administration um. So basically it was in
Speaker 1: a natural it was a separation into good bank, a
Speaker 1: good bank, bad bank. What happened to the people who
Speaker 1: actually were in charge of the banks, a lot of them,
Speaker 1: a lot of them actually found themselves being prosecuted. A
Speaker 1: lot of the deals that they made, especially in the
Speaker 1: in the in the last moments of of of and
Speaker 1: the life of the of the failed Landers, were deals
Speaker 1: that didn't stand up to the scrutiny of the law,
Speaker 1: and they were prosecuted and then they found themselves in prison.
Speaker 1: The former head of the Icelandic Bank lands Bankie, has
Speaker 1: been sentenced to a twelve month jail term. Ziggur John Onison,
Speaker 1: was on trial for his role in the collapse of
Speaker 1: the financial sector in two thousand and eight. To other
Speaker 1: of the banks executives received nine months sentences. The lands
Speaker 1: BANKI three were accused of manipulating the bank's share price
Speaker 1: by lending cash to investors on condition they purchased stock.
Speaker 1: The global financial crisis in two thousand and eight frozen
Speaker 1: credit markets and Iceland's banks quickly collapsed. All right, Tracy,
Speaker 1: So we just heard the story of the Icelandic boom
Speaker 1: and bust of the banking sector and that the bankers, ultimately,
Speaker 1: unlike in other countries, went to jail. So let's chat
Speaker 1: with Bloomberg's Edward Robinson about the aftermath, why those bankers
Speaker 1: went to jail and what happened after that and thank
Speaker 1: you so much for joining us, my pleasure. So we
Speaker 1: were just talking about pretty much everything that happened with
Speaker 1: Iceland's banks and the financial crisis they had there. But
Speaker 1: the one thing that really sets Iceland apart from a
Speaker 1: lot of countries is that bankers involved in this crisis
Speaker 1: actually went to jail. Tell us how that happened it, Yes,
Speaker 1: it's Uh, it's a striking story because it is the
Speaker 1: only country where the top bankers CEO's chairman, as well
Speaker 1: as the top investors, the top stockholders in many of
Speaker 1: these banks also were prosecuted, convicted and ultimately incarcerated. And uh,
Speaker 1: and they got some pretty serious time. I mean, top
Speaker 1: bankers at coup Thing, which was the number one bank
Speaker 1: in Iceland when the crash it in two thousand and eight,
Speaker 1: got between four and a half and five and a
Speaker 1: half year prison sentences. And so was this a matter
Speaker 1: of they broke a specific law in Iceland? Was it
Speaker 1: something culturally that Iceland was more inclined to prosecuted bankers.
Speaker 1: What do you think distinguished Iceland basically from the other
Speaker 1: countries where top bankers didn't go to prison. I think
Speaker 1: there's a couple of things. The first is political, and
Speaker 1: I mean Iceland is small. It's three d and thirty
Speaker 1: three thousand people. That's about the same population as the
Speaker 1: neighborhood of Flatbush in Brooklyn. So so it impacted when
Speaker 1: the crisis hit, When the banks crashed, it impacted every
Speaker 1: Icelander and that's not hyperbole, it actually did so. Purchasing
Speaker 1: power dropped by a fifth, stock market crashed, lots of
Speaker 1: Icelanders had debts that in foreign currencies that they couldn't pay,
Speaker 1: So the political repercussions were serious. Icelanders, we're throwing eggs
Speaker 1: and yogurt, which is like this weird Nordic thing at
Speaker 1: the Parliamentary building. So the politicians they're directly felt the anger.
Speaker 1: So politically they felt they had to address this problem
Speaker 1: and it wasn't going to be enough to issue big
Speaker 1: fines or kind of go after the bank's institutionally, which
Speaker 1: is what we saw in the U S and the UK.
Speaker 1: So that's the political dimension. But the legal dimension is
Speaker 1: that in Iceland, and in fact in Nordic kind of
Speaker 1: Scandinavian jurisprudence, they don't use jury, so the prosecutors never
Speaker 1: had to really put together cases that could take complex
Speaker 1: financial machinations and simplify and present to a jury. And
Speaker 1: that's been one of the impediments. What was the specific
Speaker 1: crime that they went to jail for, because the USA, Yeah,
Speaker 1: it was really awful what they did, but you know,
Speaker 1: there really isn't a crime against failure. So what was
Speaker 1: the crime? And what happened with the Icelandic banks was
Speaker 1: essentially en Ron, So all of the big banks were
Speaker 1: collateralizing their loans with their own stock and then they
Speaker 1: were providing those loans to their number one investors and
Speaker 1: number one stockholders. So the whole thing was predicated on
Speaker 1: the stock not going down, and of course when it did,
Speaker 1: it's like game over. So you're able to use time
Speaker 1: honored statutes to attack that. That's market manipulation and that's fraud.
Speaker 1: I have a technical devil's advocate type question, which Joe
Speaker 1: is probably going to kill me for asking. But you
Speaker 1: have basically the government going after the bankers. You know,
Speaker 1: there's no jury trial. Uh. And in the same context,
Speaker 1: the government was setting a lot of the rules and
Speaker 1: regulations that allowed Icelandic banks to do this. Right. For instance,
Speaker 1: Icelandic banks issued a whole bunch of hybrid capital far
Speaker 1: more than was allowed elsewhere in Europe or in the
Speaker 1: Nordic countries. Was there any blowback for the government or
Speaker 1: the regulators for letting that happen. Yes, there was a
Speaker 1: lot of anger for that. I mean, I think that's
Speaker 1: a really good point. I mean, basically, what the government
Speaker 1: did is they deregulated. They took this kind of state owned,
Speaker 1: very conservative banking culture, and in the space of a
Speaker 1: few years, they they deregulated them allowed them to go private,
Speaker 1: and that's what kind of set in motion all of
Speaker 1: the explosive growth. Uh So, yes, you're absolutely right. There
Speaker 1: was a lot of anger on the part of people
Speaker 1: directed toward the government for permitting this to happen. And
Speaker 1: in the prosecutions that have taken place, there have been
Speaker 1: a few government officials who have been implicated. So you
Speaker 1: mentioned earlier that even though these bankers have gone to jail,
Speaker 1: there is still collective outrage in Iceland, which we've seen
Speaker 1: this week. And I should just mention here that we
Speaker 1: are recording this podcast slightly early. We're talking days before
Speaker 1: it's due to be published, so a lot could be changed,
Speaker 1: could change, But we have seen people, as you put it,
Speaker 1: throwing yogurt and government officials and government buildings. What's going
Speaker 1: on there? Uh. It really goes to this um feeling,
Speaker 1: the suspicion that the game is still fixed and they
Speaker 1: want a new government, that that there's twenty thousand protesters
Speaker 1: in the square who are basically saying we want a
Speaker 1: snap election. This government doesn't deserve to continue to be
Speaker 1: in power, and that it's a coalition government and they're
Speaker 1: trying to hold it together. Uh. And what's really fascinating
Speaker 1: about that, tracy is that the the insurgent Party, the
Speaker 1: party that is now polling an has been doing so
Speaker 1: for the last year. It is polling at the top.
Speaker 1: They're called the Pirates. I'm really fascinated by this. I
Speaker 1: want to I want to join. Well maybe, but I
Speaker 1: want to learn more the polling number one right now.
Speaker 1: I love the idea that perhaps the Pirate Party could
Speaker 1: leave the next government. One thing is striking you say
Speaker 1: twenty people have showed up to protest. Just for context,
Speaker 1: that's about twenty million equivalent in the United States. Given
Speaker 1: how tiny Iceland is, what is it That's just an
Speaker 1: extraordinary number. How is it as a country that so
Speaker 1: many people get mobilized for something like this, is it
Speaker 1: a cultural thing? How how do you get those kind
Speaker 1: of it is it is? It's like, um, I mean, imagine,
Speaker 1: imagine if the entire United States was the size of Louisiana,
Speaker 1: just Louisiana and Katrina Hits. That's what the banking crisis
Speaker 1: was for Iceland. I mean, it was just this seismic catastrophe.
Speaker 1: It's like the biggest thing ever to happen in country
Speaker 1: since it broke away from Denmark, you know, fifty sixty
Speaker 1: years ago. And so it's personal. It's deeply, deeply personal
Speaker 1: for them, and that's why you see these protests and
Speaker 1: and the protests that have happened this week in response
Speaker 1: to Panama papers. The numbers are actually greater than the
Speaker 1: protests during the crash. So I think what that conveys
Speaker 1: is this sense of, you know, we're tired of the
Speaker 1: old system. And it's really interesting when you put it
Speaker 1: in the larger context of what's happening with political regimes
Speaker 1: elsewhere in Europe, even in the United States, and like,
Speaker 1: there's something something really interesting happening with this idea that
Speaker 1: the old regimes are no longer useful, and that's why
Speaker 1: this pirate Party is really starting to reap the benefits
Speaker 1: of that, and it will be fascinating if somehow they
Speaker 1: have a snap election and it wins the majority of
Speaker 1: seats in parliament, that will be quite an experiment. Right So,
Speaker 1: and I was going to ask, in some respects Iceland
Speaker 1: is ahead of other countries in terms of prosecuting the
Speaker 1: people responsible for the financial crisis. But even on that basis,
Speaker 1: people are outraged, perhaps more outraged than they were just
Speaker 1: a couple of years ago. Does that bode well or sorry,
Speaker 1: bode ill for the rest of the world. That's a
Speaker 1: great question. I think it speaks to this kind of
Speaker 1: just I don't know how to put it, but it's
Speaker 1: like it's like this deep seated feel like something is broken.
Speaker 1: That's I think that's the way that the sociologists we
Speaker 1: talked to an Iceland, we were talking about that, and
Speaker 1: he's like, look what happened in a wait for all
Speaker 1: of the remedies that have been put out, and Iceland
Speaker 1: deserves a lot of credit for being swift and taking
Speaker 1: decisive action on implementing these remedies. I mean, let's not
Speaker 1: forget when Iceland's economy is going to grow four percent
Speaker 1: this year. Unemployment is less than you know, two point
Speaker 1: eight percent, So I'm on a macro basis, they're doing
Speaker 1: pretty good. Um, but something broke in two thousand and
Speaker 1: eight in Iceland and in other countries, and that that's
Speaker 1: what the sociologist saying is like, that's what we're really
Speaker 1: seeing is that you just you just it's broke. Something
Speaker 1: is there's this feeling that it's broken. And that's why
Speaker 1: Brigitta John's daughter, who was a co founder of the
Speaker 1: Pirate Party and their leader in parliament right now, she's
Speaker 1: she's a poet, she's like friends with Julian Assange. She's
Speaker 1: one of her first things that she'd love to do
Speaker 1: if she ever became leader in Iceland is grant Edward Snowden,
Speaker 1: you know, citizenship. I think that's really fascinating what you
Speaker 1: point out about how solid the economy is, low unemployment,
Speaker 1: high growth. I mean, I remember thinking in the US
Speaker 1: after our crisis and then in two there was the
Speaker 1: Tea Party wave, and it seemed like, Okay, this is
Speaker 1: a very natural reaction to massive unemployment and still so
Speaker 1: many people underwater on their homes. Now we fast forward
Speaker 1: several years be we're close to full employment. In the
Speaker 1: US and now obviously in the U S we have
Speaker 1: Donald Trump. So it's sort of the same thing. Even
Speaker 1: with the on the service healing of the economy, something
Speaker 1: seems to be, as you say, sort of broken and society.
Speaker 1: I think, you know, obviously you're seeing it across Europe
Speaker 1: as well. Just the improvement in raw economic numbers don't
Speaker 1: necessarily translate to people having confidence in their institutions and government.
Speaker 1: What do you think the next step is for Iceland?
Speaker 1: What does the future actually hold? Well, they've got too big,
Speaker 1: two big events to come on the economic slash financial side. Uh,
Speaker 1: they've been under capital control since the crash. And even
Speaker 1: though Iceland can sell its bonds overseas, and even though
Speaker 1: um if an Icelander you know, flies from Kia Vic
Speaker 1: for a holiday in Italy, they can withdraw you know,
Speaker 1: euros and Italian a t m s and kind of
Speaker 1: move money that way. You can't you can't drain your
Speaker 1: bank account in Iceland, put it in a suitcase and
Speaker 1: you know, moved to the UK. Those controls are going
Speaker 1: to be lifted now they haven't said an exact date,
Speaker 1: but it will be very important for the country because
Speaker 1: it truly will mark like they're rejoining of the international community.
Speaker 1: They're going to let the Croner float. That's a big event.
Speaker 1: The second one is the two largest banks in the
Speaker 1: country right now, Lens Banking and East Lens Bankie, which
Speaker 1: are successors to the failed banks from two thousand eight.
Speaker 1: They are now state controlled and the current ruling government,
Speaker 1: along with the Central Bank, have plans to eventually privatize
Speaker 1: those banks. That will be an epic story because that
Speaker 1: process has to be transparent, it has to be fair,
Speaker 1: it has to realize value. And given what's happened just
Speaker 1: in the last couple of weeks with Panama papers the
Speaker 1: trust issue with government, that's going to be interesting. And
Speaker 1: just to finish up, I mean Brigitte to John's daughter
Speaker 1: if she if the Pirate Party do take power, they
Speaker 1: have vowed to stop the privatization process. I have to say,
Speaker 1: I just really just from a pure New US fascination sample,
Speaker 1: and I really want them to win. I know I'm
Speaker 1: not supposed to take sides on these things, but we
Speaker 1: all have to be rooting to see what happens when
Speaker 1: the Pirate Party takes when the pirates come to power.
Speaker 1: Pirates come to power, Yeah, it's just for that Heine story.
Speaker 1: All right, thank you so much for joining us. Thank
Speaker 1: you my pleasure. So, Joe, did you like that story
Speaker 1: as much as I thought you would. Yeah, I love
Speaker 1: the story. I think my favorite aspect of the story
Speaker 1: is just this idea that Iceland is just this tiny
Speaker 1: country on an island and hardly anybody lives there, and
Speaker 1: the idea of um, you know, essentially what in the U.
Speaker 1: S would be medium sized city, all going through these
Speaker 1: gigantic economic and political convulsions altogether. The thing that amazes
Speaker 1: me is, you know, it's now seven or eight year
Speaker 1: is on from the two thousand financial crisis, and we
Speaker 1: are still seeing the ripple effects throughout society. And I
Speaker 1: always feel like you and I were financial journalists, so
Speaker 1: we naturally think about it all the time, and sometimes
Speaker 1: I feel like we're biased and there's possibly other things
Speaker 1: to be thinking about. But then a story like this
Speaker 1: comes up and I think, no, this actually is a
Speaker 1: big deal, and we are still seeing the ripple effects
Speaker 1: in the wider society, not just in Iceland but around
Speaker 1: the world. Yeah, and I think there's a point that
Speaker 1: the economy has covered to quite an extent, I mean
Speaker 1: almost anyone in the world would be thrilled with an
Speaker 1: unemployment rate of below three percent. Growth of four percent
Speaker 1: per year is the envy of basically every developed country
Speaker 1: you can think of, and the fact that we have
Speaker 1: the Iceland has these strong numbers yet still has this
Speaker 1: very deep frustration and anger mistrust with the elites. I
Speaker 1: just think, you know, there's incredibly important from a broader
Speaker 1: perspective to understanding what's going on, you know, the UK
Speaker 1: and the rest of the EU and obviously the EU
Speaker 1: the US. You made the point that it may bee
Speaker 1: is sort of like a bell weather for what could
Speaker 1: happen elsewhere, and I think that's certainly in itself a
Speaker 1: compelling reason for people to care about what happens in Iceland.
Speaker 1: Promise me, Joe that if the Pirate Party does come
Speaker 1: to power, we will do an Odd Lots episode on
Speaker 1: the economics of piracy. Yeah. I absolutely we're going to
Speaker 1: do that, But I really hope we could do an
Speaker 1: Odd Lots in Iceland talking to them, because, as I said,
Speaker 1: I really want this to happen, because I think just
Speaker 1: from a journalistic standpoint, it will be fascinating to see
Speaker 1: what happens. I think that's it for Today. The article
Speaker 1: is called This Is Where Bad Bankers Go to Prison.
Speaker 1: It's by Edward Robinson and Omar Valdemarson. You can find
Speaker 1: it on Bloomberg dot com or in the latest issue
Speaker 1: of Bloomberg Markets Magazine. I'm Tracy Alloway. I'm on Twitter
Speaker 1: at Tracy Alloway, and I'm Joe wi Isn't All Managing
Speaker 1: editor at Bloomberg Markets. You can follow me on Twitter
Speaker 1: at the Stalwart and thanks for listening to Oddline.