Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe Wisenthal. Joe, I am
Speaker 1: looking at a chart of the ten year US treasury yield.
Speaker 1: You're not. I'm not. I'm not. Actually, how I know
Speaker 1: you're not because we're actually sat together for once. Yeah,
Speaker 1: we're actually in a studio together. So normally we're on
Speaker 1: the phone. The last time we recorded an episode in
Speaker 1: studio together, I think we were both in London. Now
Speaker 1: we briefly crossed paths in New York, Yeah, which is
Speaker 1: a nice change. Okay, So I am not actually looking
Speaker 1: at a chart, but I'm imagining you're looking at a
Speaker 1: chart of it. I'm visualizing the chart. I can see
Speaker 1: the yield. It's above two point six percent for the
Speaker 1: first time in years, really first time knows March really
Speaker 1: only a year. But nonetheless it has been a sharp
Speaker 1: move up. And if we continue this sharp move up,
Speaker 1: we could soon see day year highs and long term
Speaker 1: interest rates. Right, So, whenever we have a spike in
Speaker 1: US interest rates, we get a bunch of people who
Speaker 1: come out of the woodworks and start talking about the
Speaker 1: end of the thirty year bull market. In government bonds. Yeah,
Speaker 1: this is something that if you're in markets, you know
Speaker 1: all about that. The US treasury market has been in
Speaker 1: almost a NonStop bull market since the early eighties. We
Speaker 1: yields grinding lower and lower. You know. I think to
Speaker 1: the outside world when you hear bull and bear market,
Speaker 1: you think about the stock market, and sometimes we're in
Speaker 1: a bull market and sometimes we're in a bear market.
Speaker 1: But amidst all these changing economic conditions, the bond bull
Speaker 1: market has been virtually NonStop for about three decades. Yeah,
Speaker 1: for most of our lives. Basically. Now, whenever you get
Speaker 1: people talking about the end of the great bull market
Speaker 1: and government bonds, you also get people who start talking
Speaker 1: about demographics, which you wouldn't necessarily think about when you
Speaker 1: think about US treasuries government bonds. No, but I guess
Speaker 1: it makes sense because if a bull market could persist
Speaker 1: through changing economic conditions, then naturally there's an inclination to
Speaker 1: look for structural explanations that could explain why something is
Speaker 1: persisting even when the economy is up and down. Right,
Speaker 1: So the kernel of the argument why the bowlmarket and
Speaker 1: bonds will never end because of demographics is usually we're
Speaker 1: going to have all these aging people and they're going
Speaker 1: to need assets in one form or another as they
Speaker 1: enter retirement, and those assets are most likely to be
Speaker 1: US treasuries and that will lend itself to some long
Speaker 1: term demand for the assets. I promise you it's more
Speaker 1: interesting than I just made it sound. Well, I'm very interested,
Speaker 1: but could it really be that easy? Can we really say, oh,
Speaker 1: a bunch of people are retiring that they're going to
Speaker 1: have to buy financial assets and they'll buy bonds like
Speaker 1: that almost seems like it's a free money. Well, I
Speaker 1: have the perfect person to ask this question. Our guest
Speaker 1: for this episode is Amlin Roy. He is chief retirement
Speaker 1: strategist over at State Street Global Advisors, and can I
Speaker 1: just say before I bring him on, shout out to
Speaker 1: U Bloomberg Intelligences, Ira Jersey are chief US rate Strategists
Speaker 1: for suggesting Amone as a guest. So, Ammon, thank you
Speaker 1: so much for joining us. Thank you for inviting me,
Speaker 1: Tracy and Joe, it's a pleasure to be on your show.
Speaker 1: And when tell us a little bit about what you
Speaker 1: do before we get into the bondball market and the
Speaker 1: structural reasons for it. What is your background, what is
Speaker 1: your area of study. I am a former academic specialized
Speaker 1: in asset prices, but for the last eighteen years I've
Speaker 1: been doing research building macro models to try and understand
Speaker 1: demographics and pensions. So I started this and credit So
Speaker 1: it's about in two thousand. It started off as public
Speaker 1: policy advisory to governments of how to deal with the
Speaker 1: demographics time bomb I growing massive old people to be
Speaker 1: supported by shrinking mass of young people, and then over
Speaker 1: time I extended it to trying to understand growth rates,
Speaker 1: fiscal sustainable and expanded the universe of interest to so
Speaker 1: called short term investors, hedge funds, private equity because I
Speaker 1: believe that demographics is not just long term, it is immediate,
Speaker 1: short term and long term. And after nineteen years at
Speaker 1: Credit Source, I had the privilege of moving to the
Speaker 1: buy side last year and in a similar role, but
Speaker 1: looking at global retirement promises across the world for private
Speaker 1: pension plans, for public pension plans, also understanding demographics for
Speaker 1: sovereign wealth funds, endowments and charitable foundations. So that's what
Speaker 1: I do. But my role is global and I'm very
Speaker 1: very happy to learn globally from investors and people like you.
Speaker 1: So specialist in asset valuations and demographic sounds like the
Speaker 1: perfect guest. Yeah, I would broadly agree with that. But okay,
Speaker 1: so I have to ask, So you were specializing in
Speaker 1: asset prices, so was demographics and natural jump for you?
Speaker 1: Is the impact of demographics on asset prices that pronounce
Speaker 1: absolutely not. It came as a surprise to me. I
Speaker 1: used to do emerging markets currencies for thirty six countries
Speaker 1: and teach derivatives and as surprising, So it came as
Speaker 1: a shock. But the way I've evolved and looked at
Speaker 1: demographics has become quite innovative because it place to two
Speaker 1: of my strengths. I'm a macroeconomics professor who looked at
Speaker 1: growth and why countries grow faster than others and some
Speaker 1: other countries go slower. At the same time, I was
Speaker 1: teaching finance of derivatives as surprising, so I said, when
Speaker 1: people said, do demographics, I said, let's try and understand
Speaker 1: why countries are growing faster than others. How demographics place
Speaker 1: to it. And that's when I discovered that a lot
Speaker 1: of what I taught in asset pricing in macroeconomics missed
Speaker 1: out on understanding demographics because economists, investors actualis took a
Speaker 1: very distorted and a very nuanced, narrow view of demographics. Demographics.
Speaker 1: I went to the English lexicon to understand where does
Speaker 1: the term come from? Demos, his people, graphers, his characteristics.
Speaker 1: Nowhere is there a reference to something called age. So
Speaker 1: if you consider the moss and graphers, to me, the
Speaker 1: most important characteristic of Joe, or you or myself is
Speaker 1: that from the time we are born till the date
Speaker 1: we die, we are consumers. There are seven point five
Speaker 1: five billion consumers today in the world. Baby born in
Speaker 1: mass General is a consumer. So is the oldest living
Speaker 1: woman in Okinawa, Japan, age hundred and thirteen. They're consuming
Speaker 1: different things. Then if we look at three of us,
Speaker 1: we are also workers. Workers contribute to GDP and consumers
Speaker 1: consume about se GDP. And I want to quote the
Speaker 1: biggest management group of twentieth century who highlighted this in
Speaker 1: a way, but we as economists didn't pay attention. He's
Speaker 1: also called the biggest pensions grow of the world. His
Speaker 1: name is Peter Drucker. He said in Management Challenges for
Speaker 1: the twenty one century, demographics is the single most important
Speaker 1: factor we don't pay attention to. But when we do
Speaker 1: pay attention, we missed the point. And that's because as
Speaker 1: all of us contrived of this framework where we thought
Speaker 1: demographics is all about age. Rather, I think it's about
Speaker 1: consumers and workers. And that makes it much more interesting
Speaker 1: because consumers are people for a company who give revenues
Speaker 1: to companies, and workers of courts. If you look at
Speaker 1: it that way, demographics effects income statement and balance sheets
Speaker 1: for individuals, households, or pres and nations. And I've managed
Speaker 1: to connect it to heterogeneity, asset prices, robotics, geopolitics, discount creates, etcetera,
Speaker 1: and previous research that I've done. So we're all consumers
Speaker 1: and that turn consumer. One thing I think we consume
Speaker 1: is and in different ways throughout our life, is we
Speaker 1: consume financial assets. We buy financial assets so that we
Speaker 1: have them later in life. So how much is this
Speaker 1: aspect of our consumption understood, or more specifically, how important
Speaker 1: is this aspect in understanding the link between demographics and
Speaker 1: financial asset prices? Brilliant question, Joe, and I will tell
Speaker 1: you something that we all got wrong, everybody in financial markets,
Speaker 1: and that is that we decided to classify all the
Speaker 1: consumers into three age groups. And this is what Sam Wilson, Modigliani,
Speaker 1: merturn all of us and I taught for twenty years
Speaker 1: that between zero two T there are three types of
Speaker 1: life cycle that we go through young non workers which
Speaker 1: is zero to fifteen workers sixteen to sixty four, and
Speaker 1: the retirees who are sixty five plus. But we've missed
Speaker 1: out on a very very, very very important thing that
Speaker 1: is that the retirees fall into two groups, young retirees
Speaker 1: sixty to seventy nine and old retirees who are A
Speaker 1: T plus. The A T plus behave very very differently
Speaker 1: than the younger retirees. And the A T plus population
Speaker 1: in the world is the fastest growing population over the
Speaker 1: last forty five years. From seventy they've grown at four percent,
Speaker 1: when the whole world population has only grown by hundred percent.
Speaker 1: Le Me take it down to markets. In Japan, the
Speaker 1: A T plus population in nineteen seventy was one percent.
Speaker 1: In two thousand fifteen, it's eight percent, so they've grown
Speaker 1: eight fold. In US they were two percent, it's double
Speaker 1: to four percent. In Italy it was two percent, it's
Speaker 1: gone to seven percent. The question you should say is
Speaker 1: why should we care on land. We should care because
Speaker 1: in nineteen seventy, Japan's debt to GDP was roughly about
Speaker 1: Today Japan's debt to GDP is roughly about to sixty percent,
Speaker 1: and a lot of it is attributed to the very
Speaker 1: fact that these old people are very expensive, much more
Speaker 1: expensive than the young retirees, and they are growing at
Speaker 1: a very fast rate, and that's a universal change. The
Speaker 1: fastest growing is Hong Kong, where there's been a change
Speaker 1: of three thousand, eight hundred plus percent, Singapore percent, and
Speaker 1: in the world we've seen a change of focent Japan
Speaker 1: with roughly about seven percent of increase. And we need
Speaker 1: to disentangle the fact that these older retirees are not
Speaker 1: buying the same kind of financial assets as the sixty
Speaker 1: five to seventy nine year olds. And that is quite
Speaker 1: quite important because when I look at the share of
Speaker 1: the lot of people talk about the hundred year life,
Speaker 1: When I look at the share of the hundred plus population,
Speaker 1: that's hardly point one four percent in Japan and the
Speaker 1: point zero three percent in US. But when I look
Speaker 1: at the share of the eight t plus population in Japan,
Speaker 1: that's where we see that it's projected to grow from
Speaker 1: somewhere close to eight percent to twelve percent in about
Speaker 1: twenty years time, and it's close to about one percent,
Speaker 1: four percent, six percent in countries such as Italy. And
Speaker 1: that's a very very major thing. We need to disentangle
Speaker 1: the very old retirees from the young retirees. Now, let's
Speaker 1: move to Joe's question. What we said is baby boomers
Speaker 1: born between ninety six to sixty four. And I taught this,
Speaker 1: and part of it is wrong, and I corrected it
Speaker 1: in two thousand one two two, once I started learning
Speaker 1: a bit more of demographics. We said that the older retirees,
Speaker 1: the first baby boomers, will start turning sixty five around
Speaker 1: two thousand and eleven or so, and once they start
Speaker 1: turning sixty five, they will take all their equities, move
Speaker 1: into treasury bills and cash, and there will be a
Speaker 1: big stock market meltdown. I raised three questions, and so
Speaker 1: did people like Robin Brooks and Goldman Sacks and We
Speaker 1: and Milton Friedman and others, saying that that was common folklore.
Speaker 1: My question was who would they sell it to a huge,
Speaker 1: big generation of baby boomers to a smaller generation of
Speaker 1: other people? What kind of prices will they get? Second,
Speaker 1: I want you people to popularize a question which I've
Speaker 1: been asking and no one's answered, and the question I'm
Speaker 1: going to put in the following way. Jo says, I'm
Speaker 1: on your sixty five, you need to retire. Tracy says,
Speaker 1: I've got the best inside line to God. You will
Speaker 1: die when you're eighty five. My simple question to the
Speaker 1: whole world is twenty years is post retirement. How much
Speaker 1: money do I need for twenty years of post retirement?
Speaker 1: Can anyone answer that question? And the answer to me
Speaker 1: is no, because we don't know inflation, we don't know
Speaker 1: health care expenses which are MSMI Parkinson influenced. We also
Speaker 1: don't know how GDP growth is going to behave, we
Speaker 1: don't know what's going to happen to the equity premier.
Speaker 1: So I claim that the biggest mistake of corporate governance
Speaker 1: over the last hundred years has been long term promises
Speaker 1: made on DV pensions when no one even can guarantee
Speaker 1: me what my salary increased the next three years is
Speaker 1: going to be. How can you tell me that twenty
Speaker 1: years later I'm going to get paid X Y or
Speaker 1: is that so? If we can't answer questions over long
Speaker 1: term horizons. We should not make long term promises, and
Speaker 1: this is why Peter Drucker, in his book Unseen Revolution
Speaker 1: The Pensions Revolution, said that these long term promises aren't
Speaker 1: sustainable and that led to the advent and growth of
Speaker 1: defined contribution for a one key plans in the US.
Speaker 1: So I feel like I'm back at university, act really
Speaker 1: and sitting at a really interesting lecture. But amman, I'm
Speaker 1: still fascinated by the impact of demographics on asset prices.
Speaker 1: So when you look at demographics from this much more
Speaker 1: nuanced view and from a sort of consumer behavior view,
Speaker 1: how does that change the overall picture of the idea
Speaker 1: that you're going to have a bunch of old people
Speaker 1: who are going to need longer term safer assets. Very
Speaker 1: good question, and I'm going to take you two Safer
Speaker 1: assets have to come. But we are in a world
Speaker 1: of low growth, and low growth is linked to demographics.
Speaker 1: And one of the key paradigms to understand growth is
Speaker 1: a freework developed by the ECB which I use a
Speaker 1: lot over the last in twelve years, it says GDP
Speaker 1: growth comes from three components working age population growth. How
Speaker 1: have the people between the working age group, consider it
Speaker 1: sixteen to sixty four, twenty to sixty five grown, second
Speaker 1: is labor productivity growth and third day is labor utilization growth.
Speaker 1: If you were to be able to predict these three components,
Speaker 1: you could add and get GDP growth. And I've done
Speaker 1: analysis looking at GDP growth across the G six countries,
Speaker 1: which is U, s UK, Frantically, Germany, Japan, and across
Speaker 1: all these countries. The biggest reason why we've seen a
Speaker 1: decline in growth over the last and fifteen years has
Speaker 1: been declined in labor productivity growth. And labor productivity growth
Speaker 1: is defined as real GDP divided by ours work, so
Speaker 1: growth in real GDP divided by ours work, and all
Speaker 1: over the world we are seeing that this is the
Speaker 1: culprit for lower GDP growth. And I have a very
Speaker 1: simple solution to increase GDP growth because if the GDP
Speaker 1: growth pile increases, then savings will increase, and that savings
Speaker 1: can then be used to defray income from those savings
Speaker 1: towards paying for retirement promises. And to increase labor productivity growth,
Speaker 1: you need to do just two things in increase female
Speaker 1: labor force participation growth and increase youth labor participation growth.
Speaker 1: So to me, GDP growth is suffering because these two components.
Speaker 1: Youth unemployment is at an all time high, and I
Speaker 1: show that there's a big gender gap even in countries
Speaker 1: like US and UK, which is uh And there's also
Speaker 1: a wage gap. So on average, women in UK and
Speaker 1: US gets paid let's say a dollar, then the mail
Speaker 1: gets paid fifty percent more. In Japan the mail gets
Speaker 1: paid hundred thirty percent more. In France and Germany it's
Speaker 1: fifty six percent more. But in Nordic countries the gap
Speaker 1: is hardly ten percent. So I claim that we need
Speaker 1: to close the gender gap, and we need to deal
Speaker 1: with youth unemployment, which people haven't paid enough attention to.
Speaker 1: And youth unemployment has come about largely because of two reasons.
Speaker 1: A global workforce where you've taken an immigrants and the
Speaker 1: impact of technology in terms of say things to pay
Speaker 1: for people. The big uns certainty years. If I'm at
Speaker 1: age sixty, how much will I live again? Finance and
Speaker 1: economics has been quite wrong in focusing on life expectancy
Speaker 1: at birth. What we should focus on is life expectancy
Speaker 1: at age sixty, seventy seventy five and that has been
Speaker 1: expanding because of that uncertainty. A lot of people who
Speaker 1: are baby boomers expecting to retire at two thousand eleven
Speaker 1: two thou twelve have extended, and we claimed in the
Speaker 1: Demographic Manifesto that's what should happen. So in countries like Japan,
Speaker 1: in countries like Sweden, in countries like Korea, people are
Speaker 1: working beyond their official retirement age, not because somebody is
Speaker 1: holding a gun to their head, but rather they realize
Speaker 1: that they don't have enough money to last out the
Speaker 1: uncertain twenty twenty five years. So the big pictures, you know,
Speaker 1: sort of combining some of these trends that you've identified.
Speaker 1: You know, we started off the conversation talking about the
Speaker 1: sort of unquenchable thirst were safe assets, the great bond
Speaker 1: ball market, that's last sin's the early eighties. How much
Speaker 1: would you say these trends have attributed to that? And
Speaker 1: then is there anything on the horizon that could say
Speaker 1: this is going to end? Or well, there is this
Speaker 1: just another false dawn for the bond bears. Brilliant questions.
Speaker 1: So I go back to what we taught our students,
Speaker 1: and again I claim finance theory of the sixties seventies
Speaker 1: eighties is flawed because it didn't consider the fact that
Speaker 1: rates would be low and real rates would be negative.
Speaker 1: So typically insurance companies and pension funds were told in
Speaker 1: the sixties seventies eighties, we learned and we taught our
Speaker 1: students that for long dated liabilities, so you retired at sixty,
Speaker 1: you have got a twenty year liability, or you retired fifty,
Speaker 1: you've got a thirty year liability. To meet long term liabilities,
Speaker 1: the safe assets were considered to be long term bonds.
Speaker 1: But at that time, the long term bonds were giving
Speaker 1: you three, four or five percent in real terms, were
Speaker 1: giving you sometimes seven, eight, ten percent in nominal terms. Today,
Speaker 1: government bands, I will say, are giving you negative real returns.
Speaker 1: I would claim they should not even be considered the
Speaker 1: admissible asset to match liabilities. What we should do is
Speaker 1: broaden the universe of fixed income to include things which
Speaker 1: give better returns, such as emerging market bands, such as
Speaker 1: high yield bands such as credit. But because they are riskier,
Speaker 1: we need to do some risk management. And therefore I
Speaker 1: do believe that the right assets are not long term
Speaker 1: bonds giving you negative real returns. There's another aspect to it,
Speaker 1: and this was my biggest call. In two thousand one,
Speaker 1: the day the U. S Treasury said no more thirty
Speaker 1: year bond issuance, I was on the west coast of
Speaker 1: California meeting the biggest bond and equity investors, where I
Speaker 1: made a call that U S will come back and
Speaker 1: reissue thirty year bonds. And the supply of thirty year
Speaker 1: plus bonds in the G ten countries is roughly one
Speaker 1: seventh the demand of long term bonds. So if the
Speaker 1: demand for long term bonds is so much higher, coming
Speaker 1: from pension funds, reinsurers and insurers, then the price of
Speaker 1: the long term bond will be high, and the yield
Speaker 1: at that time used to be four percent. I made
Speaker 1: a prediction will go from four to three to two
Speaker 1: for the thirty year bond. Now there's been a bit
Speaker 1: more pick up in supply of longer term bonds. Demand
Speaker 1: for long term bonds yet hasn't fallen that much, so
Speaker 1: we're seeing a little bit of a pick up, but
Speaker 1: ultimately we forget the fact that long term demand and
Speaker 1: supply are affected by behavior, are affected by supply, affected
Speaker 1: by what the Debt Management Office of UK does relative
Speaker 1: to the U S Treasury relative to Germany and Japan,
Speaker 1: they all behave in slightly different ways, and that is
Speaker 1: going to drive the yields and we should not forget that.
Speaker 1: So Amon, I have a sort of theoretical caution. But
Speaker 1: you brought up the thirty year bond. And if we
Speaker 1: know that we have this expanding group of old people
Speaker 1: who will need a certain amount of safe assets, should
Speaker 1: we be creating more assets to satisfy them, And do
Speaker 1: those assets necessarily have to come in the form of
Speaker 1: a longer term government debt. Excellent question. I attended a
Speaker 1: lunch with the Debt Management Office of UK and Germany
Speaker 1: just a few days ago, and the answer to your
Speaker 1: second part of your question is not every government has
Speaker 1: their appetite and the inclination to issue fifty, sixty, seventy
Speaker 1: year bonds which have been issued by Japan, which have
Speaker 1: been issued by UK, but have not been issued by
Speaker 1: Germany and few other countries. So countries which don't issue
Speaker 1: all these longer term bonds can oftentimes manage with ten
Speaker 1: and thirty, but then they have to be very active
Speaker 1: in terms of rolling them over, in terms of managing them,
Speaker 1: and in terms of understanding that the demand dynamics of
Speaker 1: the shorter term bond instruments, if they are ten or fifteen,
Speaker 1: will be very different than thirty or fifty a bond instrument. Now,
Speaker 1: I do believe, and this is what I've been going
Speaker 1: and speaking to treasuries over last eight ten years about that,
Speaker 1: whether it's the Netherlands, whether it's Germany, whether it's Switzerland,
Speaker 1: we should be issuing a lot more long dated bonds
Speaker 1: because it's easier to try to match a thirty year
Speaker 1: employees probably sixty year liability rather than trying to match
Speaker 1: it using rolling over two twenty year bonds to get
Speaker 1: sixty years. So I do think that there needs to
Speaker 1: be but it depends again on the appetite of governments.
Speaker 1: My personal view is we should be having more inflation
Speaker 1: linked long term bonds and just like the tips like
Speaker 1: the O eighties, as well as the guilts, because once
Speaker 1: inflation kicks up, which I expected to hopefully if we
Speaker 1: go back to normal conditions. I consider these conditions to
Speaker 1: be a normal dissequilibrium, conditions that central bankers and we
Speaker 1: have never seen before earlier, and we don't know how
Speaker 1: to deal with properly. And that's why we've taken so
Speaker 1: long to recover from what I called the global financial crisis.
Speaker 1: I do not ascribe to the term of great recession
Speaker 1: on this tough right, Amlin, I'm afraid we're going to
Speaker 1: have to leave it there, Amlin Roy from State Street
Speaker 1: Global Advisors. Thanks samlad that was absolutely fascinating. Really, I
Speaker 1: appreciate you coming up. Okay, thank you guys. Joe. That
Speaker 1: was a really interesting conversation about demographics the longer term
Speaker 1: impact on asset markets. And I gotta say I liked
Speaker 1: Amlin's point about markets are essentially about selling something to someone.
Speaker 1: There is a consumer out there buying these goods or securities.
Speaker 1: I think that's really easy to forget. So we talked
Speaker 1: about a bond and we say, okay, well, inflation is this,
Speaker 1: and GDP we talk about a stock if we say
Speaker 1: earnings are this, at growth rate is this? And competitive
Speaker 1: landscapes this. But there's also a supply of the asset
Speaker 1: and someone has to buy it, and people have needs
Speaker 1: and they have to plan for those retirement needs. And
Speaker 1: if you look at assets in isolation and not think
Speaker 1: about the market where real humans need to accumulate these assets,
Speaker 1: sounds like you miss a pretty big aspect of it. Yeah,
Speaker 1: And the other point I think he made is that
Speaker 1: we have had this massive demographic change where we have
Speaker 1: just a lot more older people who are living for longer,
Speaker 1: and our financial market hasn't necessarily evolved in step with
Speaker 1: that demographic change. So he used the example of the
Speaker 1: third year US Treasury. I feel like we could be
Speaker 1: more creative when it comes to meeting that demographic problem,
Speaker 1: Like why do we just need to be focused on
Speaker 1: longer term US government debt? Surely there's a banker out
Speaker 1: there who is coming up with some really esoteric, exotic
Speaker 1: thing to meet retirement needs. We should do uh an
Speaker 1: episode soon specifically on annuities. And because they're the people
Speaker 1: who run that stuff, think a lot about very specifically
Speaker 1: about these questions. And I think we could UH dive
Speaker 1: a lot more into the aspect of what changing demographics
Speaker 1: mean for sort of planning people's future financial security. Add
Speaker 1: thoughts the retirement serious, Let's do a serious I can
Speaker 1: see our producer looking worried, looking Yeah, alright, that is
Speaker 1: it for this episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm
Speaker 1: Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway,
Speaker 1: and I'm Joe wisn'tal. You can follow me on Twitter
Speaker 1: at The Stalwart and follow our producer to foror Foreheads
Speaker 1: at foreheads T and the Bloomberg head of podcasts, Francesco
Speaker 1: Levie at Francesco Today