Speaker 1: If it doesn't work, you're just not using enough. You're
Speaker 1: listening to Software Radio, Special Operations, military news and straight
Speaker 1: talk with the guys and the community. Hello again, everyone,
Speaker 1: Welcome back to Software Bradio. Software Bradio on Time on Target.
Speaker 1: I'm your host today, Steve Balistarie joining me. We have
Speaker 1: a co host, which is always nice to have. It's
Speaker 1: always nice to have some support here. Sean spont from
Speaker 1: Software Our new editor in chief is U joining us
Speaker 1: today and we're going to be talking very shortly with
Speaker 1: somebody that we've talked to in the past. Dennis Blasco
Speaker 1: is a retired lieutenant colonel out of the U. S. Army.
Speaker 1: Was just under i believe twenty five years service as
Speaker 1: a military intelligence officer and a foreign area officer. He
Speaker 1: specialized in China, which we're going to be talking about today.
Speaker 1: He served in infantry units in Germany, Italy and Korea,
Speaker 1: as well as d C at the d i A
Speaker 1: Headquarters and the Army Office of Special Operations. From ninety
Speaker 1: two to ninety six, he was the Army out of
Speaker 1: Shay in Beijing and Hong Kong. So Dennis is our
Speaker 1: subject matter expert when it comes to talking about China
Speaker 1: and Chinese I guess yeah, influences that are going on
Speaker 1: right now, and we're gonna be talking about China and
Speaker 1: Taiwan specifically. But before we do that, I just need
Speaker 1: to read you, guys to add from one of our sponsors.
Speaker 1: Hey again, everybody, Steve Balustrade here. I want you to
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Speaker 1: With that being said, let's get to our guests right now.
Speaker 1: Sean and I would like to welcome Dennis Glasco back
Speaker 1: to the Software dot Com podcast and Uh, Dennis, once again,
Speaker 1: thanks for taking the time this afternoon. It's a beautiful
Speaker 1: day in the neighborhood. Let's talk some Chinese. Well, thank
Speaker 1: you very much, happy to be here. Yeah. So there's
Speaker 1: a lot of stuff in the news, and we hear
Speaker 1: about it all the time about you know, the Chinese
Speaker 1: acting very aggressive towards the Taiwanese and it seems to
Speaker 1: be increasing. Um. You know, we hear about incursions in
Speaker 1: their airspace, you know, every day, it seems like. So,
Speaker 1: what's your take on this whole Taiwanese you know Chinese uh,
Speaker 1: you know situation, as the Chinese soldiers actually preparing to
Speaker 1: invade there or is this just posturing. Well, there's a
Speaker 1: lot to unpack in that question, and so we should
Speaker 1: probably but one step at of time. Uh, But let's
Speaker 1: talk first about the Chinese actual um, at least they're
Speaker 1: stated uh preferences and national strategy. UH. And indeed, reunification
Speaker 1: with Taiwan is probably at the very top of their
Speaker 1: objectives uh, to achieve sometime in the future. Uh. There's
Speaker 1: been a lot of talk recently about exactly when that
Speaker 1: time frame is for achieving unification. But UH in reality
Speaker 1: that's UH. There may be some signs on walls someplace,
Speaker 1: but at least UM openly, I'm not seeing them consistently
Speaker 1: say that there is a set date for us to
Speaker 1: achieve unification. And unification has looked at as one of
Speaker 1: the very important elements of what they call the rejuvenation
Speaker 1: of of China UH, making UH China into one of
Speaker 1: the uh yeah large countries, top top players and in
Speaker 1: all elements politically, diplomatically, militarily, economically, etcetera. UH, and and
Speaker 1: generally that goal for that that that they have stated
Speaker 1: has been more towards mid century or two nine, which
Speaker 1: would be the hundred anniversary of the founding of the
Speaker 1: People's Republic of China UH. In UM so, like I said,
Speaker 1: reunification is a main goal, but they would prefer to
Speaker 1: do it peacefully. They would prefer to UM basically in
Speaker 1: the civil war UH peacefully because they they certainly could
Speaker 1: punish Taiwan right now or in any time into the future,
Speaker 1: but they would much rather have a UM a non
Speaker 1: hostile takeover. Unfortunately, the trends are not looking good for that,
Speaker 1: but UM that officially is there UH. Their position Sian
Speaker 1: and militarily. Their main of objective at this time is
Speaker 1: to deter to be able to show UH China's capability
Speaker 1: and willingness to use force to deter further steps towards
Speaker 1: UH independence by Taiwan. So UH deterrence is right now
Speaker 1: one of the main elements of everything that we're seeing
Speaker 1: the Chinese do. Sean Welcome, I mean Mr Moscow, welcome
Speaker 1: to the show. It's very nice to have you with
Speaker 1: us again. It was nice to meet you at the
Speaker 1: symposium two weeks ago. Very interesting, very interesting talking again
Speaker 1: before we came on today, we were talking a little
Speaker 1: bit about a recent news item about the Chinese Army
Speaker 1: looking to increase the masculinity of their force. You had
Speaker 1: a very interesting observation about the changing demographic of the
Speaker 1: the Chinese Army relative to their conscription service. I was
Speaker 1: wondering if you might share that with the audience right well,
Speaker 1: as you know that the Chinese Army still UH is
Speaker 1: a conscript army, conscript military, and I estimated probably about
Speaker 1: a third of the two million active duty personnel either
Speaker 1: volunteer or if they don't volunteer UH, they are conscripted
Speaker 1: to serve two years um and part of the general
Speaker 1: trends in China over the past forty years or so
Speaker 1: has been a move away from UH the rural farming
Speaker 1: areas and moving into the big city at ease. And
Speaker 1: as the UH population has moved into the cities and
Speaker 1: the economy has really taken off and China has gotten richer,
Speaker 1: many fewer people are working in the fields in UM
Speaker 1: in China UM and a whole lot more are living
Speaker 1: the relatively UH and and for most Chinese the good
Speaker 1: life in the cities. And one of the things that
Speaker 1: they actually we've seen them complain about this for literally
Speaker 1: the past twenty years or more, was that more and
Speaker 1: more of their new recruits, whether they volunteer or whether
Speaker 1: they're conscripted involuntarily, UH, just aren't the same sturdy, hardy
Speaker 1: folk that they used to have that came out of
Speaker 1: the the fields in rural China for the first you know,
Speaker 1: well for almost all of the last century in the UH. SO,
Speaker 1: what they're seeing is as UH China has gotten richer
Speaker 1: UH in many cases, the younger people have gotten sort
Speaker 1: of fat and happy and aren't accustomed to hardships in
Speaker 1: the same way that the old rural youth used to be.
Speaker 1: And so I think a lot of the discussion right
Speaker 1: now is just a continuation of this trend that's sort
Speaker 1: of is seen a lot more Chinese youth being disqualified
Speaker 1: for not being able to do the proper amount of
Speaker 1: push ups, for having bad eyesight, being too fat. Uh,
Speaker 1: big problems. Yeah, you know, and changed, they've changed the
Speaker 1: standards over the years. They've allowed uh shall we say,
Speaker 1: larger people to come on active duty. Um, but then
Speaker 1: you know they put them through the ringer in basic
Speaker 1: training and uh, you know they end up having to
Speaker 1: run run their three kilometers five kilometers, do their sit ups,
Speaker 1: push ups, whatever. And uh the last statistic I saw
Speaker 1: was several maybe a decade or so ago, but they
Speaker 1: talked to like about dropping out during basic training. I
Speaker 1: wouldn't be surprised if that's even higher now, m Um.
Speaker 1: You know when you yeah, and and number one, when
Speaker 1: you are already recruiting every year, you have to bring
Speaker 1: in one third of UM or one third of your
Speaker 1: force is um conscripts. That means half of one third
Speaker 1: or um of two million is what five hundred thousand
Speaker 1: or so. That's a lot of folks you've got to recruit. Uh.
Speaker 1: So they uh, that they have a large population obviously. Uh.
Speaker 1: But again this all it also relates back to the
Speaker 1: one child policy. Uh that families only had one we're
Speaker 1: allowed to have one child. So there's uh fewer of
Speaker 1: them for one thing. And then one of the things
Speaker 1: that we used to see them constantly talking about was
Speaker 1: because they were one child and they had two parents
Speaker 1: and oftentimes four grandparents, they were doated on and so
Speaker 1: again you know, they were given candies and soft drinks
Speaker 1: and whatever, and you know, the many folks consider them
Speaker 1: to be, you know, to be soft. So coming into
Speaker 1: the military is a big change for a lot of
Speaker 1: these folks. H Um. You know, they really have to
Speaker 1: work the way up to meet the minimal military requirements.
Speaker 1: In terms of us, it's something like a significant it's
Speaker 1: going to be a significant problem in China because they
Speaker 1: have I think something like seventy million surplus males in
Speaker 1: that country. Um, you know, exceeding the population of females
Speaker 1: is a seventy million person imbalanced their and thing from
Speaker 1: the male populations. So for them to have problems that
Speaker 1: are showing up being able to conscript people who meet
Speaker 1: the sort of physical requirements they want to see, for
Speaker 1: their military. It sounds like it's a significant problem. I'd
Speaker 1: like to ask a follow up on that end, ask
Speaker 1: if you have any of you on how the the
Speaker 1: Taiwanese having problems like this too, How would you put
Speaker 1: the Thaiwanese soldier up against the Chinese soldiants of comparison
Speaker 1: and fighting ability and that? Well, again, I don't follow Taiwan,
Speaker 1: but from what I have heard, uh, Taiwan number one,
Speaker 1: I believe also has sort of a draft or conscription,
Speaker 1: But I believe they're only conscripted for like four months
Speaker 1: or something, right, and so it's a very short period
Speaker 1: of time. Perhaps more people cycle through um or a
Speaker 1: larger percentage of the younger population cycles through the military,
Speaker 1: but you know, whatever period of time they're in is
Speaker 1: hardly sufficient to really move up the professional uh chain,
Speaker 1: to to be able to do something more than put
Speaker 1: your uniform on, no when to salute and know how
Speaker 1: to you know, shoot a twenty meter target. So kind
Speaker 1: of like the kind of like the Swiss conscription system,
Speaker 1: I'm very ever trying to make everybody into a reservist
Speaker 1: and have sort of basic military training. It might be
Speaker 1: a little bit different than that, but uh, yeah, you know,
Speaker 1: and I don't know what the the Taiwan of the
Speaker 1: policy on Taiwan for having guns in your house is,
Speaker 1: but that I think is a major component of the
Speaker 1: Swiss militia, you know, has their weapons in the house.
Speaker 1: I don't think that's the case in on and and
Speaker 1: literally one of the major questions about the whole China
Speaker 1: Taiwan military balanced situation is the willingness of the Taiwan
Speaker 1: people to resist and uh, how willing are they to
Speaker 1: fight and to endure the hardships that will certainly come
Speaker 1: if uh if if an actual war started. And I
Speaker 1: think again my personal analysis is that the p l
Speaker 1: A and China would prefer not to have that war
Speaker 1: fought because it would lay waste to a large part
Speaker 1: of Taiwan. Either way, when loser draw, a lot of
Speaker 1: Taiwan would be UH would be very severely damaged. And um,
Speaker 1: they want to take it all in one piece. I'm sorry,
Speaker 1: I said they'd like to take it all in one piece,
Speaker 1: wouldn't Well, they would prefer yeah much. They would much
Speaker 1: prefer to be able to maintain Number one, the economic
Speaker 1: You know, there's a huge flow economically back and forth
Speaker 1: between UH, Taiwan and the mainland, and both sides are economics.
Speaker 1: UH do a lot of trading and do and in
Speaker 1: many ways dependent on the other. Uh. So if you,
Speaker 1: you know, break the economic back of Taiwan, which would
Speaker 1: be one way to move towards unification, you then have
Speaker 1: to rebuild Taiwan, and uh that doesn't sound like an
Speaker 1: attractive option for them. If they could achieve their goals
Speaker 1: without having to destroy are you know, literally killed the
Speaker 1: good golden goose? Well, I wonder about that too, because
Speaker 1: I'd like to know what you think about the comparison
Speaker 1: between the People's Liberation Army and the people People's Liberation
Speaker 1: Army navy arm whether you think there's a difference in
Speaker 1: the quality of the personnel between those two benches of service,
Speaker 1: and looking at China's development of a six ownership navy,
Speaker 1: I I wonder if they couldn't find an in between
Speaker 1: on invading Taiwan and instead have a navy big enough
Speaker 1: to enforce a blockade that would compel them to surrender.
Speaker 1: I wonder, I wonder what you think about that. Yeah, well,
Speaker 1: the navy actually is different than the than the army
Speaker 1: in that Uh, the navy has a much larger percentage
Speaker 1: of n c o s, And in fact, the Navy
Speaker 1: itself says that it of its personnel or n c
Speaker 1: o s, which means that conscripts are much fewer in
Speaker 1: the Navy, much smaller percentage, and on the front line
Speaker 1: ships and submarines they say that they're n c o
Speaker 1: s comprised roughly of the crew. So what that means
Speaker 1: is compared to say, the infantry, UM or some rocket
Speaker 1: forces or artillery or whatever which have a could have
Speaker 1: of their unit as conscripts, the Navy has many, uh
Speaker 1: much smaller percentage of conscripts, so it could mean can
Speaker 1: maintain a higher level of operational readiness and actually be
Speaker 1: out at sea with its officers and n c o
Speaker 1: s and fewer conscripts much more often than um. Most
Speaker 1: ground units can be out there training because ground units
Speaker 1: are basically trying to get their conscripts ready to take
Speaker 1: part as part of the squad, platoon, battalion, whatever, Whereas
Speaker 1: the ships can maintain a higher level of readiness than
Speaker 1: there um their brothers in arms on the ground. And
Speaker 1: you see that not only in ships but also in
Speaker 1: the p l A aviation air both Air force aviation
Speaker 1: units and naval aviation units which have higher percentages of
Speaker 1: officers and CEOs, which then again means that those units
Speaker 1: can can train more often, reach higher levels of unit
Speaker 1: readiness and UM, and do things like they've been doing
Speaker 1: for the past several years flying around Taiwan, uh, you know,
Speaker 1: sailing around Taiwan and in various other places. They can
Speaker 1: do that because they are less dependent on the conscripts.
Speaker 1: Does it remind you of the Soviet Union's naval model
Speaker 1: that that sounds similar to me? They had a very
Speaker 1: high percentage of n c o s and sort of
Speaker 1: performed the core of the navy, and then they were
Speaker 1: bringing in the conscripts to do you know, the chipping
Speaker 1: and the painting and the cleaning. Is it? Does it
Speaker 1: strike he is being similar in many ways. I look
Speaker 1: at the two years the conscripts spend on on active
Speaker 1: duty is basically an apprenticeship, and if they prove that
Speaker 1: they are fit enough, smart enough, have the political um,
Speaker 1: the right political thinking, uh, then they can be asked
Speaker 1: to stay and become an n c O or maybe
Speaker 1: even go to an officer school. Uh so Uh. In
Speaker 1: the Navy, I think they are Navy and Air Force
Speaker 1: both are able to maintain those higher levels of operations.
Speaker 1: But at the same time, UH, they're also they've also
Speaker 1: been getting large numbers of new equipment, more advanced equipment.
Speaker 1: So much of the Navy and Air forces time has
Speaker 1: been spent MHM integrating the new equipment into units and
Speaker 1: obtaining unit proficiencies, whether in the air or at sea.
Speaker 1: And a lot of what we're seeing UH, in my opinion,
Speaker 1: while it can be used to send a message to
Speaker 1: Taiwan and the United States, Japan or other countries along
Speaker 1: the South China Sea, a lot of what we are
Speaker 1: seeing is UH routine training which is then UH publicized
Speaker 1: and propagandized for both internal and external consumption. And so
Speaker 1: it's very important to look at what what all this
Speaker 1: training the that gets noticed UH and publicized and see
Speaker 1: what is actually being done in that training. It's a
Speaker 1: very good question. And Steve and I were talking about
Speaker 1: that last metal Filondum and Steve pointed out to me
Speaker 1: that approximately of their training day is taken up by
Speaker 1: political indoctor nation. I was wonting if know if that
Speaker 1: is correct, and what is their typical training day like
Speaker 1: is a ten hour or twelve hour or eight hour
Speaker 1: UM that's a that's a day of a week in
Speaker 1: the typical search numbers. You know, UH day in the
Speaker 1: United States on an eight hour shift during two hours
Speaker 1: of two hours of political indoctrination day isn't know what
Speaker 1: you're thinking about that, right? The actual regulations call for
Speaker 1: twenty of a unit's training time to be devoted to
Speaker 1: political and inductor ideological training. And many years ago I
Speaker 1: asked UH an officer, well, which units have and which
Speaker 1: units have and of the answer I got and you
Speaker 1: know this is a h just one, it's one data point.
Speaker 1: He said. It's more likely, UH that the more advanced
Speaker 1: units would would spend of time training while the UH
Speaker 1: units that would have to spend more time in maintenance.
Speaker 1: Shall we say, older equipment might spend more time. But yes,
Speaker 1: whether it's twenty or thirty percent, it's still a lot
Speaker 1: of time UH spent reading newspapers, singing songs, watching television,
Speaker 1: you know, UH making sure that the people are are
Speaker 1: understand what the history of the party, their responsibility of
Speaker 1: the party, and UH in our loyal UH. What they're
Speaker 1: doing in that period of time is trying to improve
Speaker 1: morales so much that they can depend on the soldiers.
Speaker 1: Officers and c o s and conscripts to to follow
Speaker 1: orders when when called upon. So uh, we may uh,
Speaker 1: and that this twenty doesn't mean, you know, it has
Speaker 1: to all happen on one one full day. Uh, but
Speaker 1: there can be political training during downtime between doing tables
Speaker 1: on a firing range or something. Uh. And a lot
Speaker 1: of it, you know, a lot of its singing, dancing
Speaker 1: things like that. So it's in some ways it's um,
Speaker 1: it's sort of rest and relaxation, um, making sure you're
Speaker 1: a good communist along the way. Well, I don't, I don't, No,
Speaker 1: I'm trying to go ahead. No, I'm just saying from
Speaker 1: you know, I think any battalion and brigade commander that
Speaker 1: I ever worked for would be very upset if he
Speaker 1: were told to to spend scent of his time doing
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff. Yeah, imagine. Well, I don't know
Speaker 1: the last time I heard anything about any defection from
Speaker 1: the Chinese military. So I guess it's effective. I guess
Speaker 1: they're they're doing pretty good at keeping the people in line.
Speaker 1: And do you have any information on that, whether there's
Speaker 1: a problem with defection desertions within the Change military. Yeah, Well,
Speaker 1: they're just recently a couple of months ago there were
Speaker 1: there was a report I forget whether it was one
Speaker 1: person or several persons who had been conscripted but then
Speaker 1: basically refused to do anything. Um and uh takes courage. Yeah,
Speaker 1: And basically he was put on trial or they were
Speaker 1: put on trial and um kicked out of the military. Uh.
Speaker 1: They could not work for the government, they could not
Speaker 1: get any benefits, they cannot travel. UM. It really a
Speaker 1: sort of limited their options, shall we say. Uh. But
Speaker 1: as for desertions, I know of one twenty years ago. UM,
Speaker 1: but I haven't seen much of that lately. And we're
Speaker 1: talking with Dennis Blasco here on Software Bradio. We're talking
Speaker 1: about Chinese military uh and possible, you know, confrontation with Taiwan.
Speaker 1: But before we go any further, I just wanted to
Speaker 1: read a quick add from one of our sponsors. Once again.
Speaker 1: Check out our How We Reach coaching tool. It's a
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Speaker 1: we Reach app at r H dot gov. That's r
Speaker 1: h dot gov today. Thank you, Dennis. Getting back to this,
Speaker 1: I wanted to kind of turn the clock back. The
Speaker 1: last time we spoke. You know, we talked about this
Speaker 1: Chinese military and right now, you know it's uh, obviously
Speaker 1: with the amount of people they have and the modernization
Speaker 1: of the air force and ships, they're they're obviously a
Speaker 1: formidable adversary. But you know, we also talked about that
Speaker 1: conscript army and you you touched on it earlier about
Speaker 1: you know, a third of their force really turns over
Speaker 1: every year. And I mean does that, um, does that
Speaker 1: turnover I want to say, I want to ask you
Speaker 1: does that turnover really affect how how well these units
Speaker 1: can be trained, especially within the army. Yes? Absolutely, uh.
Speaker 1: I think. Well, one thing that is different though than
Speaker 1: our military, in addition to the on the whole conscription idea,
Speaker 1: is that officers and n c o s, on the
Speaker 1: other hand, will stay in the same unit for ten
Speaker 1: twelve years. Um. So while the conscripts are turning over
Speaker 1: every year in large numbers, you do have a backbone
Speaker 1: of officers and n c o s who do learn
Speaker 1: to to work together over the over that same period
Speaker 1: of time. But to me, much of what they must
Speaker 1: feel like it's groundhog Day, because you know, just as
Speaker 1: they get one batch of new recruits integrated into their squad,
Speaker 1: platoon or company, then another half of the conscripts demobilize
Speaker 1: and they go through the same cycle again. And so
Speaker 1: every year UH, in what I call, like I said,
Speaker 1: the conscript heavy units. UH, they are working to primarily
Speaker 1: to establish squad, platoon, company, and at best battalion proficiencies.
Speaker 1: And this has especially been true UH in the past
Speaker 1: four years, since they've totally revamped their organization in and
Speaker 1: they went to a much more combined arms structure than
Speaker 1: they had been before, and so in many units were
Speaker 1: completely changed. Many personnel were told, well, you used to
Speaker 1: be artillery, you're now recon or year now an engineer. Uh.
Speaker 1: They had their ms changed just overnight without any formal training. UH.
Speaker 1: So a lot of these things have had a major
Speaker 1: impact for the past four years. And it's only now
Speaker 1: that they're being being beginning to come uh to establish
Speaker 1: some of these UH proficiencies at battalion level and beginning
Speaker 1: to do larger exercises. UM. The the number of large
Speaker 1: exercises that went on prior to the the reforms Uh,
Speaker 1: numbered in the dozens every year for several years, but
Speaker 1: after reforms that that number dropped down to single jets.
Speaker 1: But now I'm expecting that number of larger exercises to
Speaker 1: start um increasing again as the new units have learned
Speaker 1: how to establish their new proficiencies as required under their
Speaker 1: new organization, new doctrine, and oftentimes with new equipment. Yeah, Dennis,
Speaker 1: I wanted to ask you about something, and again this
Speaker 1: goes back to what we talked about, you know before,
Speaker 1: and that's uh, you know, the the Chinese really haven't
Speaker 1: had a any kind of military I guess combat experience
Speaker 1: since that brief uh foray into Vietnam that I believe
Speaker 1: it was in the nineteen seventy nine or night um
Speaker 1: seventy nine. It was okay, Yeah, and the Chinese themselves
Speaker 1: talk about what they call peace disease for their military.
Speaker 1: Is this something that they are really concerned about in
Speaker 1: Are they going to try to rectify that somewhere? So? No,
Speaker 1: they certainly are. Again, I just read an article two
Speaker 1: days ago that talked about uh, that exact problem, uh
Speaker 1: and they and it was with regard to their university
Speaker 1: uh curriculum. Uh. Basically what they what the battalion commanders
Speaker 1: are telling the university, the p l A academies is
Speaker 1: that you're not training us for for our new jobs.
Speaker 1: And uh, you know, we were in this new organization,
Speaker 1: but the curriculum is like it was before we we
Speaker 1: we reorganized. Right now they are trying to change those
Speaker 1: curriculum the curriculum and better educate and train their officers
Speaker 1: and n c o s to do these things. And
Speaker 1: especially in the army, they're looking at doing it now
Speaker 1: at battalion level, when previously the regiment was the level
Speaker 1: that did independent operations, but now they're trying to push
Speaker 1: that down onto battalions. And it's only been within the
Speaker 1: past few years or so that they even given battalion
Speaker 1: commanders of staff. That staff is maybe five or six
Speaker 1: full time people, which is i'd say pretty light for
Speaker 1: uh if you're going to try to do seven high
Speaker 1: intensity combined arms operation at battalion level. So I think
Speaker 1: eventually they're going to find that they need to get
Speaker 1: bigger staffs at battalion level, UH and better trained officers
Speaker 1: and n c o s to do this staff work.
Speaker 1: And again, I think this is one of the things
Speaker 1: that we have uh, well, we may we the United
Speaker 1: States military may not have fought up here competitor anytime recently.
Speaker 1: Our staffs have done this planning and adaptation uh necessary
Speaker 1: on the battlefield in periods of high stress, for extended
Speaker 1: lengths of time, and I look at that as as
Speaker 1: one of our asymmetric advantages. Yeah. You know, one of
Speaker 1: the things that I read recently is that you know
Speaker 1: the p l A in there, you know, mark I
Speaker 1: guess modernization, Uh, you know programs that they're running, they're adapting,
Speaker 1: I guess, and they're being heavily influenced by Russian doctrine
Speaker 1: and with full structure and equipment and stuff like this.
Speaker 1: Is that something that you believe in or or is it?
Speaker 1: Are they going to their own? Well, they study, they
Speaker 1: studied Us, they study the Russians, they study anybody that
Speaker 1: has had recent combat experience. But they they have a
Speaker 1: very close relationship, which we are encouraging. And this is
Speaker 1: not something I think we should be doing. But uh,
Speaker 1: the the way that we're lumping Russia and China together
Speaker 1: sort of encourages them to uh to cooperate more. And uh,
Speaker 1: the Russians have trained a lot with the Chinese. They've
Speaker 1: probably been well, they certainly have been their single uh
Speaker 1: most frequent UH foreign training partner, and the Russians UH
Speaker 1: are indeed trying to help the p l A learned
Speaker 1: some of these basics that they have learned through combat
Speaker 1: and you know, various places over over the years, um so,
Speaker 1: And the Chinese do UH send their officers to uh
Speaker 1: Russian academies uh to to to learn to go to school. Um.
Speaker 1: But the bottom line is even though they study US,
Speaker 1: they study the Russians, they study Israelis, they like I said,
Speaker 1: they study the Brits and you name it. Their studying
Speaker 1: them all. They constantly talk about doing things their way,
Speaker 1: or they talk about modernization with Chinese characteristics, and they
Speaker 1: realize that every one of these other systems is different
Speaker 1: than theirs and has different constraints, different constraints than they do.
Speaker 1: So uh what what they learned from these other countries
Speaker 1: they then adapt to their situation, John, excuse me, mhm um,
Speaker 1: there's a something you said that kind of interesting. I
Speaker 1: was listening when you were talking about the long term
Speaker 1: service of their NCOs in these regiments. Would it seems
Speaker 1: to me like that would almost lead to a sort
Speaker 1: of cliquishness wouldn't it. Do you have these guys that
Speaker 1: have been up the put the unit for ten twelve
Speaker 1: using have these conscripts coming in, UM do you think?
Speaker 1: What do you think at least that sort of environment
Speaker 1: within those units where you have the US and them
Speaker 1: kind of mentality. UM. Well, actually they at least from
Speaker 1: what you see on the videos of them greeting the
Speaker 1: new soldiers, the new recruits, they they really are going
Speaker 1: out of their way to to welcome them into UH,
Speaker 1: into the unit, and they talk about the new recruits,
Speaker 1: look at their squad leaders, their friend things like that,
Speaker 1: so that they are really trying hard to UM to
Speaker 1: in to welcome the new recruits in, which is quite
Speaker 1: a difference from the way the Russians UM and the
Speaker 1: Soviets used to treat their UH conscripts. You know, I
Speaker 1: I remember reading reports of the Russians or the Soviets
Speaker 1: beating n c o s, beating the conscripts with a
Speaker 1: fence posts and things like that. I don't see much
Speaker 1: of that. I don't see any of that in the
Speaker 1: p l Ah. That's that's a that's a contrast in
Speaker 1: between we the way we welcome people into the camp
Speaker 1: and just getting off the bus at Parris Island is
Speaker 1: a is an deal in itself, So that's that's an
Speaker 1: interesting one. Literally in the p l A. From what
Speaker 1: you see is they open that welcome them with open arms,
Speaker 1: and it's uh, it's shall I say, much different uh
Speaker 1: induction than than I went through fifty some years ago. Yeah.
Speaker 1: I remember my first morning at Great Lakes, Illinois. We
Speaker 1: were awakened by a garbage can being kicked down the
Speaker 1: squad day and guys tossing us out of our racks
Speaker 1: on the floor. I didn't feel welcome. I can a fall.
Speaker 1: It wasn't a welcome experience. Yeah. Well, well these guys
Speaker 1: will do a lot of sit ups in mud and
Speaker 1: with logs on their chest and things like that, so
Speaker 1: you know, they get back in a different way. What
Speaker 1: what would you have to tell me? Tell us about
Speaker 1: the different quality in Chinese armored fighting vehicles, tanks and
Speaker 1: a PC sum. I can recall from the first call
Speaker 1: for pictures of Chinese built tanks for the Iraqis that
Speaker 1: had sometimes and one able to shooting through two of
Speaker 1: them at a time. And as I recalled, there was
Speaker 1: some talk about the Chinese selling stuff to the Iraqis.
Speaker 1: Had thinned out armor in them that they weren't actual
Speaker 1: full main battle tanks. They were had half the armor
Speaker 1: plate in them that a normal T fifty two or
Speaker 1: T sixty two. Do they think the quality of their
Speaker 1: weapons has improved a great deal significant amount. Yeah, it
Speaker 1: certainly has improved. And this takes me back what you
Speaker 1: said to when I was in Beijing. I had a
Speaker 1: marine colleague who I was there just after the first
Speaker 1: goal or yeah, the first goal for and he basically,
Speaker 1: uh cleaned up the battlefield after the after the battles,
Speaker 1: and we were at a you know, cocktail party or something,
Speaker 1: and there was somebody from the Chinese defense industries uh
Speaker 1: there and uh my colonel buddy said, uh, mentioned that
Speaker 1: he had just come back from from the war, and
Speaker 1: the the Chinese said, ah, so you saw a lot
Speaker 1: of our equipment on the battlefield. What did you think
Speaker 1: about it? And like a like a good marine he said,
Speaker 1: it burned real good. And the guy, the Chinese rep
Speaker 1: didn't say anything after that blocked away. Yeah. I wonder
Speaker 1: if they sell that stuff with a warranty. Yeah, But
Speaker 1: over the years that that that stuff was UM again
Speaker 1: Soviet era UM and it was what the Iraqis were
Speaker 1: buying high end Soviet stuff and low end Chinese stuff.
Speaker 1: And I was in Korea at the time. In the
Speaker 1: second I D and UH again we got the same
Speaker 1: reports as you did because we were wondering, Hey is
Speaker 1: the m one, how is it going to do on
Speaker 1: the battlefield, how's the Abram's going to do on the battlefield? Well,
Speaker 1: they both eight up the Soviet era equipment UH and
Speaker 1: the Chinese. That was a as we would say, a
Speaker 1: significant emotional experience for the Chinese watching the UH success
Speaker 1: of the high technology UH advanced forces of the United
Speaker 1: States and coalition forces in that period in both air
Speaker 1: and ground and it h UM. They did a couple
Speaker 1: of double takes and they said, Okay, now, guys, as
Speaker 1: much as we hate to do it, we're gonna have
Speaker 1: to go in all in, all in on this equipment.
Speaker 1: And UH. That's one of the things they've been doing
Speaker 1: since that time, is really focusing on modernizing UH their
Speaker 1: equipment in all services, and the Army is probably behind
Speaker 1: the other services, but right now i'd estimate that probably
Speaker 1: in the Army about one third of the A p
Speaker 1: c s and tanks still maybe a little less now
Speaker 1: it changes every year, but still a significant amount is
Speaker 1: Soviet era, like the BMPs UH type UH type literally
Speaker 1: type fifty five. In US they call them Type fifty nine.
Speaker 1: But there are still hundreds of them in in the
Speaker 1: p l A, many of them out west, but some
Speaker 1: of them spread out, some of them upgraded slightly. But
Speaker 1: h you here talk that. In fact, they have talked
Speaker 1: about the Chinese set the date of two uh modernized
Speaker 1: Personnel Equipment Organization and doctrine, And I estimate I take
Speaker 1: that to mean by they plan on getting rid of
Speaker 1: all the um Soviet era pre two thousand designed and
Speaker 1: produced equipment in their inventory and produced and and replace
Speaker 1: it by UH more modern, more advanced equipment. But still
Speaker 1: their armies uh nearly a million person strong. So they've
Speaker 1: got they they've got a lot of equipment to replace,
Speaker 1: and that it's so much time. Yeah, can we afford it?
Speaker 1: We have the money to do it well. For example,
Speaker 1: there top of the line tank that type probably costs
Speaker 1: are they're they're selling it overseas or an export version
Speaker 1: of it for four to five million dollars a copy,
Speaker 1: And yeah, our our M one is probably more like
Speaker 1: eight or more million a copy. And you get what
Speaker 1: you pay for h. But their type is not the
Speaker 1: most prevalent tank. The most present prevalent tank in their
Speaker 1: inventory is the Type N series, which in many ways
Speaker 1: looks like the nine nine but doesn't have all the
Speaker 1: bells and whistles and costs about a million dollars to
Speaker 1: produce as opposed to three or four million dollars. And
Speaker 1: uh but with it, you know, you get a step
Speaker 1: down in capability. But the type is what you'll see
Speaker 1: uh in in in many, many units. And they they
Speaker 1: they acknowledge the type is going to be the backbone
Speaker 1: tank of their force, not the how many live rounds
Speaker 1: do you how many live rounds do you figure a
Speaker 1: Japanese I mean a Chinese soldier of p L A
Speaker 1: gets to fire in a year. Again, that's hard to say,
Speaker 1: you uh you uh tanks firing on tank lanes tank
Speaker 1: ranges almost every day. Um. But because us they have
Speaker 1: so many tank platoons companies out there, you know, you
Speaker 1: can always find somebody doing um target you know, live
Speaker 1: fire shooting, so um tank tables. I think we used
Speaker 1: to call it um so well. And and that's the
Speaker 1: Communist you know, so it could be the same take
Speaker 1: shooting every day it is. The communist said, I've known
Speaker 1: for telling the truth because the same take out up
Speaker 1: there for two weeks, shooting and cameras and stuff. Well,
Speaker 1: there are ways we can tell that at least it's
Speaker 1: different units doing this training. Um, you know, I I
Speaker 1: monitored close enough so I can tell which you know
Speaker 1: right now. I'm just this morning, I was watching a
Speaker 1: unit that has been reported out in the field now
Speaker 1: for about three weeks and and doing this kind of stuff.
Speaker 1: But you know, would have this this brigade that I'm
Speaker 1: talking about, would have four battalions, four combined arms battalions,
Speaker 1: and so over a period of three weeks, it wouldn't
Speaker 1: surprise me they rotate all the companies through uh this
Speaker 1: basic you know, tank gunnery kind of thing. But then
Speaker 1: there are some forty armor heavy armored are heavy combined
Speaker 1: arms perades, so forty times forty uh battalions. You know
Speaker 1: that that that's a lot of battalions to run through
Speaker 1: and a lot of tanks to run through. Gunnery every year,
Speaker 1: well in three weeks is a significant amount of deployment
Speaker 1: time for that kind of work too. That's that's that's
Speaker 1: not a small you know, a weekend lawyer kind of thing.
Speaker 1: Three weeks is that's that's significant in terms of training. Yeah, well,
Speaker 1: these are these are their active duty forces. This is
Speaker 1: not the reserves, This is not a militia. These are
Speaker 1: you know, there um, what they consider their number one
Speaker 1: heavy units. Yeah, they're they're out, they're spending time in
Speaker 1: the field now. Yeah, but a lot of it, like
Speaker 1: I say, is still focused on integrating. At this point
Speaker 1: of the year, they're integrating the new soldiers into their units. Well,
Speaker 1: I wanted to again talk to you a little bit
Speaker 1: about Chinese special operations units and and when you and
Speaker 1: I talked before and then you mentioned it when Sean
Speaker 1: and I saw you um at the Global Soft Foundation symposium.
Speaker 1: The Chinese Special operations forces, you said, are a lot
Speaker 1: like similar to ranger units in particular to their missions.
Speaker 1: And you know, I look at the kind of trend
Speaker 1: that's going on. You see it and in several areas
Speaker 1: of the world, one of which where you know, where
Speaker 1: China is involved in with their only military base outside
Speaker 1: of China and Africa, the trend seems to be, you know,
Speaker 1: a war by proxy, and that doesn't seem like these
Speaker 1: type of special operations units are ready for that kind
Speaker 1: of you know, atmosphere. Do you have any inkling on
Speaker 1: if they're capable of doing anything like that? UM. The
Speaker 1: focus of the vast majority of their Special Operations brigades,
Speaker 1: which are then broken down into battalions and then companies
Speaker 1: and then teams UM, is much more at the tactical
Speaker 1: ranger type patrolling UH bright kinds of UH missions, reconnaissance,
Speaker 1: things like that, and all of their uh s o
Speaker 1: F are belong to UH army level or core level
Speaker 1: core level organizations. UM. There s o F at least
Speaker 1: an all of the doctor and I've read do not
Speaker 1: have a mission in the same way that our special
Speaker 1: forces are special operations forces UH due of foreign internal
Speaker 1: defense or unconventional warfare where they might go behind somebody's
Speaker 1: lines and set up guerrilla chains and things like that. UM.
Speaker 1: If anything, what these guys are training to do is
Speaker 1: to combat that kind of stuff in their backyard. UM.
Speaker 1: But in my opinion, UH, I think they're focused on
Speaker 1: light special operations forces and end on some high mobility
Speaker 1: light infantry h will prove useful for them, probably much
Speaker 1: more than a tank heavy or a heavy combined arms brigade,
Speaker 1: because that heavy brigade is going to take a whole
Speaker 1: lot longer to get someplace, uh than than some of
Speaker 1: these lighter units. And UM, so I see their lighter
Speaker 1: units giving them options today that they didn't have in
Speaker 1: the past. Uh. Now certainly there s O F are
Speaker 1: their their Special Operations Units as they're now UM formed,
Speaker 1: go out and they train. They train with TIE. They train,
Speaker 1: believe it or not, with Indian and Pakistani forces. They do.
Speaker 1: They've had exchanges with them where they you know, basically
Speaker 1: exchange UM teams or platoons or you know, small units
Speaker 1: and they do training for a couple of weeks. And
Speaker 1: so they're they're there and their special operations personnel, many
Speaker 1: of them have gone to the Venezuela Hunter schools, have
Speaker 1: gone to uh competitions in Jordan's and many other places.
Speaker 1: So uh they are aware of what other special Operations
Speaker 1: forces are doing, and they they are being exposed to
Speaker 1: some of those exercises and training methods. I think I
Speaker 1: think I would call I think I would call the U. S.
Speaker 1: Marines and Chinese Marines holding some kind of exchange. Sometimes
Speaker 1: I think I'm seeing pictures of that. Yeah, well, yes,
Speaker 1: you've seen things like that. But our US military contact
Speaker 1: is very UH fenced by UH by Congress and the
Speaker 1: National Defense Authorization Act. And there may be port calls
Speaker 1: and things where they teach each other how to tie knots.
Speaker 1: And you may have seen a couple instances of cooperation
Speaker 1: in UM, say anti piracy kinds of UM small individual
Speaker 1: or a small unit movement and things like that, because
Speaker 1: the Chinese are taking part in an anti piracy UM
Speaker 1: mission in the Gulf of Aiden. But anything that UH
Speaker 1: improves their capability to UH do it anst combined arms
Speaker 1: or joint operations is pretty much prescribed by by law
Speaker 1: here in the United States and most most, the vast
Speaker 1: majority of our contact of actual troops has been on
Speaker 1: a a d R Humanitary assistance and disaster relief kind
Speaker 1: of cooperation and training on their on their anti piracy stuff.
Speaker 1: Do you a system to be pretty effective of that?
Speaker 1: Are they just sort of going out there and sailing around?
Speaker 1: Are they are they get at it or are they
Speaker 1: mediocre or are they competent? Well, this is an important
Speaker 1: mission for their navy and they've been doing this since
Speaker 1: the end. They sent their first three ship task force
Speaker 1: halfway around the world UH at the end of two
Speaker 1: thousand eight, and they have basically kept three ships on
Speaker 1: station UM since that time there now I think into
Speaker 1: their rotation in so this is very important for them. UH.
Speaker 1: So far about half of their destroyer fleet and UH
Speaker 1: frigate fleet has rotated through at least one iteration of
Speaker 1: this mission. But UH this is important to them because
Speaker 1: the vast majority of their operations are conducted in within
Speaker 1: a few hundred miles of China's coast, and these are
Speaker 1: extended operations far away from China, which the p l
Speaker 1: A that this is their their longest kind of similar experience.
Speaker 1: And what they're doing is they're gradually rotating their units
Speaker 1: through so that they're both their officers and crew UM
Speaker 1: have the opportunity to do this. And like I say,
Speaker 1: right now, of their destroyers probably somewhat less than their
Speaker 1: destroyers and about half of their frigates have done it once.
Speaker 1: Many of them have done it two or three times,
Speaker 1: and many officers have and n c o s have
Speaker 1: done it two or three times also. But still compared
Speaker 1: to the amount of blue water sailing and training and
Speaker 1: UH exercising that our Navy does, UM, their their numbers
Speaker 1: are are much lower UH than than ours. Their experience
Speaker 1: level at this kind of operation is uh much lower
Speaker 1: than ours. You know, for example, what they're looking at
Speaker 1: is protecting against surface small pirate boats and so they've
Speaker 1: got a couple of helicopters that they can patrol and
Speaker 1: they you know, can dispatch things. But I'm assuming that
Speaker 1: they would also be maintaining anti submarine awareness out at
Speaker 1: see even though the pilots the pirates don't have submarines.
Speaker 1: But I would think that if they are maintaining their
Speaker 1: air awareness, air defense awareness, and anti submarine warfare awareness,
Speaker 1: even if there aren't any targets out there, Uh, they're
Speaker 1: getting experience in that. But that's still a different level
Speaker 1: of experience than what our navy has been doing for
Speaker 1: the past seventy years or more. Do you do you
Speaker 1: do you assist their sw capabild to be um are
Speaker 1: any any value with they didn't good at it your
Speaker 1: context that it's only in the past few years, uh
Speaker 1: that they've really started working on air, surface and subsurface
Speaker 1: a s W. Uh they there a s W helicopter
Speaker 1: fleet is relatively limited. They do have there. There are
Speaker 1: many of the missions right now around that are going
Speaker 1: around Taiwan are the fixed wing a s W. Uh.
Speaker 1: So they they've been they have long recognized a s
Speaker 1: W as a shortcoming and they're working to overcome it.
Speaker 1: But I'm not a sailor, but the sailors that I
Speaker 1: know say that it ain't easy and you need a Yeah,
Speaker 1: it's very hard and you need that, you need sort
Speaker 1: of an institutional memory in order to really do it.
Speaker 1: So if they're pretty much with there, and that's usually
Speaker 1: the kind of technology that allies don't like to share
Speaker 1: with one another than in the United States, to my knowledge,
Speaker 1: doesn't shine the other warfare technology want NATO. So I'm
Speaker 1: wondering if the Chinese are having to do this on
Speaker 1: their own um or if they're getting you know, cooperative
Speaker 1: sort of help from the from the Russians. Do you
Speaker 1: do you have any sense on that? Well, a large
Speaker 1: part of their anti submarine warfare helicopter fleet are Russian,
Speaker 1: are Russian birds, So yeah, I'm sure they're they're getting
Speaker 1: um getting help in that regard from from the Russians. Well,
Speaker 1: oh yeah, yeah. I've wanted to thank you for taking
Speaker 1: the time to talk with us today. Please tell our
Speaker 1: readers what you're working on where they could find your
Speaker 1: your great work and what's going on with you in
Speaker 1: the next I say, a few months. Um, well, actually,
Speaker 1: I'm working on a project that will be sort of
Speaker 1: an introduction to the Chinese Armed forces. It'll be an
Speaker 1: e book and like six or seven hours worth of presentation,
Speaker 1: but fortunately it won't be my voice. Uh, and theyre
Speaker 1: you know, talking through the power points and all that
Speaker 1: kind of stuff. So that's what I've been working on
Speaker 1: for the past about eight months. Unfortunately, it might be pricier,
Speaker 1: be might be pricier than I would want to pay,
Speaker 1: But I'll let you know when it's finally available. Uh.
Speaker 1: You know, people complained when my book was forty dollars.
Speaker 1: This unfortunately will be more than that. But you know,
Speaker 1: that's the business end of things. I don't I just
Speaker 1: provide the content. I am not a businessman. Yeah. Well,
Speaker 1: that that's rings for all of us there. But before
Speaker 1: we go, I just wanted to once again read something
Speaker 1: for our listeners out there. If you want to get
Speaker 1: soft Rep on your phone, download our free mobile app
Speaker 1: and get easy access to our articles, podcasts, gear reviews,
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Speaker 1: dot com to get access to our library of e
Speaker 1: books hopefully to include Dennis is soon uh in our
Speaker 1: exclusive team room forums and content available on all our
Speaker 1: Apple and Android devices. Dennis, thanks for taking the time today.
Speaker 1: We really appreciate it. We appreciate your insight and uh
Speaker 1: thanks again. Let's uh let's get back and do this
Speaker 1: again real soon. Where you've got my number anytime? Absolutely
Speaker 1: all right for myself, Steve Bows, Verry shaunchons from us.
Speaker 1: It's software. We want to thank our guest today, Dennis
Speaker 1: Blasgow U S Army retired. I call him our resident
Speaker 1: Chinese expert because whenever we have a question on China,
Speaker 1: first guy we email is Dennis. So for all of
Speaker 1: us here, thanks for listening. We'll be backwards another podcast
Speaker 1: real soon. Software Bridio on time on target. Don't turn
Speaker 1: that down love, been listening to self red Lad