Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe. Joe. Can you believe
Speaker 1: it has been one year since Russia invaded Ukraine? Yeah,
Speaker 1: it has been pretty extraordinary, remarkable. You're just like in
Speaker 1: so many different respects, sort of the changing narratives over
Speaker 1: time with the war, the persistence of the war I
Speaker 1: think some people might have expected to be and much sooner,
Speaker 1: changing expectations, where would go the narrative arounda the effect
Speaker 1: on commodities and economics changed a lot over the last time.
Speaker 1: And I still feel like after this time, you know,
Speaker 1: I'm still tons of ambiguity about where it's going and
Speaker 1: what the effects are going to be. Well. Absolutely, and
Speaker 1: I remember this time in two when Russia first invaded Ukraine.
Speaker 1: Some of the headline that we're flying around where you know,
Speaker 1: this is the beginning of World War three? Is this
Speaker 1: the start of some sort of you know, nuclear apocalypse? Given, um,
Speaker 1: we were talking about the involvement of Russia and potentially
Speaker 1: NATO as well, And then you mentioned the economic narrative,
Speaker 1: and that has changed quite remarkably in terms of you know,
Speaker 1: the European energy story. There were lots of concerns about
Speaker 1: We're going to have massive gas shortages, Europe isn't going
Speaker 1: to be able to handle this. But actually, fast forward
Speaker 1: twelve months, it hasn't been as bad as a lot
Speaker 1: of people seem to have expected. You're absolutely right, This
Speaker 1: winter so far has not been the disaster for the
Speaker 1: European economy that many have expected it. Interestingly, my impression
Speaker 1: is that the Russian economy is not the basket case
Speaker 1: that many would have expected either, given both the cost
Speaker 1: of prosecuting the war in terms of raw materials, human lives,
Speaker 1: and so forth, and then of course the sanctions which
Speaker 1: both limited a sort of revenue generation opportunities but also
Speaker 1: the opportunity for technical imports. And my impression, again only
Speaker 1: you know, only sort of very very modest insight, is
Speaker 1: that Russia has over time figured out ways around or
Speaker 1: how to live with these various constraints. Well, there is
Speaker 1: a vibrant debate on the extent of damages that sanctions
Speaker 1: have actually inflicted on the Russian economy, of course, and
Speaker 1: also there's a lack of information at the moment, you know,
Speaker 1: there there there are different sides in this conflict, and
Speaker 1: each one has their own story to tell. So on
Speaker 1: that note, in order to stop and think and discuss
Speaker 1: what exactly we've learned over the past year or so
Speaker 1: about this ongoing conflict. I'm very pleased to say we
Speaker 1: actually have the perfect odd thoughts guest, really, the perfect
Speaker 1: perfect guest. This is someone that I met at the
Speaker 1: Explorers Club in New York. He is a retired senior
Speaker 1: executive at the CIA. He also served with the FBI
Speaker 1: and the Defense Department. He started out as a cryptologist
Speaker 1: in the Navy, studying Russian and deploying at sea. He
Speaker 1: has a PhD in Russian history at Colombia and in
Speaker 1: Russian economic history. I should say he specialized in the
Speaker 1: history of the Russian stock market. He is now a
Speaker 1: consultant teaching at undergraduate and graduate levels. But really, I mean,
Speaker 1: I'm trying to summarize the car but really, the perfect
Speaker 1: odd lots guests. So we're going to be speaking with
Speaker 1: Robert pat Robert, thank you so much for coming on
Speaker 1: All thoughts well, Tracy and Joe, thanks for having me,
Speaker 1: and thank you for that wonderful introduction. I consider myself
Speaker 1: a bit of an odd lot, so I feel like
Speaker 1: I'm in a good place you're in the right place.
Speaker 1: I would also note that the last time we spoke,
Speaker 1: we were surrounded by life sized polar bears and narwall
Speaker 1: tusks and Ammonson's sled, So this is maybe a little
Speaker 1: bit different, but I think we'll work it out. Fine. Yeah, well,
Speaker 1: we'll ask all lots of listeners to just imagine that
Speaker 1: you are surrounded by a stuff animals and that you know,
Speaker 1: I think we were speaking during a thunderstorm um in
Speaker 1: New York and it was quite atmospheric. Okay, with that
Speaker 1: caveat Robert, why don't you start with just where are
Speaker 1: we in this conflict? You know, it's twelve months on
Speaker 1: from when Russia invaded Ukraine. A lot of people were
Speaker 1: not expecting it to make that move. Where are we
Speaker 1: in this conflict? I think this war, and we'll call
Speaker 1: it a war. It started out for the Russians as
Speaker 1: the Speziano Pazzi, the Special military Operation. We still don't
Speaker 1: like to call it a war, although every once in
Speaker 1: a while a minister like the German Foreign Minister actually
Speaker 1: come out and say that it is. But it is
Speaker 1: a war. It is one of the worst things that's
Speaker 1: happened to Europe. I think since nineteen I think we've
Speaker 1: gone well past the Balkans conflict at this point, and
Speaker 1: you know, at one year, I think this is really
Speaker 1: confounded expectations at at all levels. I remember days before it,
Speaker 1: I was doing a teleconference on this and most people said, no,
Speaker 1: the Russians, they won't do it, they're threatening there on
Speaker 1: the borders, they won't actually go in. And then on
Speaker 1: February they went in, and the way they went in
Speaker 1: was so messy, so unsound from a strategic standpoint, attacking
Speaker 1: on all fronts with insufficient personnel, with insufficient supply lines,
Speaker 1: and not expecting the bravery of the resistance of the Ukrainians,
Speaker 1: and also the level of support remember back in the
Speaker 1: time of St. Javelin and the Stingers from the US
Speaker 1: and its partners, and I think that just profoundly shocked them,
Speaker 1: because a lot of people, even in the United States,
Speaker 1: even on the intelligent side, thought no, Kiev may fall immediately,
Speaker 1: and it didn't. And then the war started to drag
Speaker 1: out and get uglier and uglier. So it's not that
Speaker 1: war anymore. It's also not what I would call the
Speaker 1: war that we saw in August and September, where the
Speaker 1: Russians woke up to their shock and realized they didn't
Speaker 1: have enough forces in country, and they were retreating wholesale,
Speaker 1: giving up territory that they in fact that annexed at
Speaker 1: one point, which is terribly humiliating for them, but it
Speaker 1: was really part of a strategic decision I think by
Speaker 1: the Russians to marshal their forces, to reduce their casualties,
Speaker 1: and to dig in until this mobilization of reserves began,
Speaker 1: not a general mobilization, but of reserves, and to strengthen
Speaker 1: their lines along the Nupper River, a natural boundary. And
Speaker 1: this fast forwards us to today as we watched this grinding,
Speaker 1: painful level of battles and places like bah Mud for example,
Speaker 1: and while we all in the United States and Europe
Speaker 1: and and and frankly in Russian and around the world
Speaker 1: marvel at all these weapons systems that are being deployed,
Speaker 1: and drones and intelligence and I s R assets and
Speaker 1: so on. This is becoming like a World War One
Speaker 1: slug fest with artillery. And I think we're reaching a
Speaker 1: point now where the main issue is who can last
Speaker 1: the longest, who has the most personnel, who has the
Speaker 1: most artillery shells, who can take the most pain and
Speaker 1: how long will the resolve of the West last in this?
Speaker 1: And I think on that account, there's there's a lot
Speaker 1: of positive news coming out of coming out of NATO,
Speaker 1: But I think the expectations at the beginning of the
Speaker 1: war on all sides have truly been confounded. I don't
Speaker 1: see a revel resolution at any point in the near future.
Speaker 1: This could end up being something where both sides are
Speaker 1: dug in and their positional battles for territory. That could
Speaker 1: be a large or more than one Russian offensive, that
Speaker 1: could be a Ukrainian counter offensive. But what worries me
Speaker 1: the most Joe and Tracy is that the expectations on
Speaker 1: both sides, it's hard to retreat from them. The United
Speaker 1: States has said we're all in, NATO has said we're
Speaker 1: all in. Russia is certainly all in as a matter
Speaker 1: of national survival and political survival at this point. So
Speaker 1: I'm kind of pessimistic about the outlook in the near term,
Speaker 1: if that's fair. Let me just add a couple of
Speaker 1: other things. There are a couple of areas that I
Speaker 1: really follow closely with this, and these are how do
Speaker 1: we define war? I think that is a fascinating strategic
Speaker 1: question going forward. What is the role of information warfare
Speaker 1: in this which I think is quite profound. And finally,
Speaker 1: something I think of interest to to to your to
Speaker 1: your listeners especially is the role of economic warfare here.
Speaker 1: This question might dovetail with your sort of thoughts on
Speaker 1: how do we define war? But some people we've spoken
Speaker 1: to and people elsewhere, they have this idea that the
Speaker 1: end of this war looks like the end of many
Speaker 1: other wars, which is not ended. But you know, persistent,
Speaker 1: low level, dotted line borders that no one ever really
Speaker 1: agrees to, but that often is how the world ends up.
Speaker 1: And I guess the classic example would be, you know,
Speaker 1: the division between Korea and North Korea, which the war
Speaker 1: is technically never ended. And I think people say, look,
Speaker 1: this is how the final chapter ys of war. Look,
Speaker 1: no one actually agrees that this is the border just
Speaker 1: sort of becomes the new border. Does that seem like
Speaker 1: the direction it's heading in? And I guess, like to
Speaker 1: to your broader point, what does it mean to say
Speaker 1: there is a war on or there isn't a war on? Ye? Joe,
Speaker 1: I think that's a really great point. It's it's it's
Speaker 1: interesting I often ask students when was the last time
Speaker 1: the United States was in a war? And there are
Speaker 1: a variety of answers. They come up with Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Speaker 1: the Global War on Terrorism. And I tell them and
Speaker 1: some of them get it that it was really in
Speaker 1: the World War Two. It was really the declaration of
Speaker 1: war in World War Two. So we're seeing new ways
Speaker 1: of looking at what participation and and a war is
Speaker 1: direct versus indirect. For example, if you equip an army,
Speaker 1: train an army provided with intelligence, give it strategic guidance,
Speaker 1: tactical guidance, and even to a limited extent, there are volunteers, mercenaries,
Speaker 1: contractors on the ground. When does a war become a
Speaker 1: hot war? How do we define a war? And I
Speaker 1: would put this in terms of the information war and
Speaker 1: the economic war too. But your point about Korea is excellent.
Speaker 1: And I think the way we're looking at this now,
Speaker 1: now that the Russians are pretty much entrenched with with
Speaker 1: a with a river, the Upper River between them, and
Speaker 1: that great open mass heading towards the fields, heading towards Kiev,
Speaker 1: I find it hard to imagine that the Russians will
Speaker 1: retreat from the areas that they've annexed Donyetsk, Luganska, Zaporojia,
Speaker 1: Zaria and Ukrainian Harson. Of course they've already lost some
Speaker 1: of these areas two brilliant Ukrainian counter offensives. But I
Speaker 1: see them fighting back until they recover these areas. And
Speaker 1: the question is when we get to your demilitarized zone,
Speaker 1: and I think it's a it's a it's a it's
Speaker 1: a brilliant concept for this is where does that end?
Speaker 1: I think if the Russians could, they would try to
Speaker 1: get the whole Black Sea coast, meaning go down to Nikolaiev,
Speaker 1: go down to Odessa maybe, and go all the way
Speaker 1: down to the Maldovan border. The Maldovan government is collapsing
Speaker 1: as we speak, and there's Transmistria there with Russian troops
Speaker 1: in it. I think it's impossible to forecast this at
Speaker 1: this point. I do not think the Russians ever sought
Speaker 1: to take all of Ukraine, not that heart land part
Speaker 1: of Ukraine, you know, going back to Alexey miy Kailovitch,
Speaker 1: the the seconds are for example, I don't think they
Speaker 1: ever had an interest in Lviv and Galicia. They might
Speaker 1: going a little bit further north towards Harket, for example.
Speaker 1: So I think you're right. I I think this will
Speaker 1: have to end with exhaustion at some point and some
Speaker 1: kind of low simmering demilitarized zone conflict line which frankly
Speaker 1: has existed in the dunbast since two thousand and fourteen,
Speaker 1: with artillery showing and fighting on both sides. I know
Speaker 1: that's not a great answer, but I don't think anybody
Speaker 1: has a great answer as to how this ends. Yeah,
Speaker 1: you know, whenever I or a question like how do
Speaker 1: we define war? I start to get flashbacks to studying
Speaker 1: international relations at university, and you know, reading the likes
Speaker 1: of Francis Fukiyama and the end of history and this
Speaker 1: idea that no to true democracies have ever gone to
Speaker 1: war with each other. And one question that I always
Speaker 1: wanted to ask a spook or a former spook, is
Speaker 1: you know when that conversation or when that talking point
Speaker 1: was at its height, you know, the early two thousands,
Speaker 1: everyone's talking about globalization and you know, democracy for the
Speaker 1: win and all of that. What did you think, you know,
Speaker 1: you're working in the background with actual intelligence reports, did
Speaker 1: you think that that was something that was plausible at
Speaker 1: that point. I I I personally thought at the time
Speaker 1: that you know, we had this remarkable victory that ended
Speaker 1: in the defeat of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of
Speaker 1: the Soviet Union, and I think there was a great
Speaker 1: opportunity early on in that after the war all fell,
Speaker 1: after the Russian Federation became an entity in the Soviet Union,
Speaker 1: went away to really help them into sort of the
Speaker 1: world global order, if you will. And we sent a
Speaker 1: bunch of venture capitalists in the time, and frankly, the
Speaker 1: Russians with Western helped really botched the privatization. It was
Speaker 1: terrible how it went about. I still have these pictures
Speaker 1: of the old ladies selling their their potential shares and companies,
Speaker 1: their certificates for a bottle of vodka, not understanding that
Speaker 1: they were worth thousands of dollars if they could just
Speaker 1: hold on, but at the time they couldn't need. The
Speaker 1: situation was terrible. They had no money in the bank whatsoever.
Speaker 1: And this became kind of a kleptocracy there where the
Speaker 1: oligarchs and later the the the the the the the
Speaker 1: power people in Russia who are more important than the
Speaker 1: oligarchs in this war just took everything, and it became
Speaker 1: a country where you were not going to have a
Speaker 1: conventional type of capitalism. So I feel there was a
Speaker 1: bit of a lost opportunity be there. I don't know
Speaker 1: if a martial plan was needed as we had after
Speaker 1: World War Two, or another massive aid package, or more
Speaker 1: just understanding how deeply wounded people like Putin who emerged
Speaker 1: from this were, the feeling that they had lost their
Speaker 1: way of life their government, for good or for bad.
Speaker 1: Communism has always resulted in dramatic failure. But when Fukayama
Speaker 1: came out and I wanted to avoid this, but you've
Speaker 1: dragged me in an alternate. I think his comment that
Speaker 1: somehow that this was the end of history, that liberal
Speaker 1: democracy had won, that all the old things that bothered
Speaker 1: people in the past, ethnicities, language, culture, borders, just jealousy
Speaker 1: over a size of military over economic resources and so on,
Speaker 1: suddenly this had gone. And I thought that was naive then,
Speaker 1: and I think it's it's naive now. He didn't invent that.
Speaker 1: Of course, this was thought after the French Revolution. This
Speaker 1: was thought with the Congress of Vienna after the War
Speaker 1: of eighteen twelve. You can even go back to Hagel
Speaker 1: and Marks and look at how the dialectic of how
Speaker 1: society would would develop and how the world would developed.
Speaker 1: I think what we're seeing now is that all of
Speaker 1: the old things that bothered people in the past and
Speaker 1: brought people to war in the past still exist. And
Speaker 1: I find it horrifying that Russians and Ukrainians, who speak
Speaker 1: relatively similar languages, who have relatively similar cultural backgrounds, are
Speaker 1: now killing each other on mass and I find that
Speaker 1: very disturbing, and I think there's almost no going back
Speaker 1: at this point. I want to ask a sort of
Speaker 1: concrete question. Maybe it's a little bit theoretical, but like,
Speaker 1: how would you characterize the degree of involvement of US
Speaker 1: and NATO in this war? Because you know, leaders in
Speaker 1: the West make pains to say we are not at
Speaker 1: war with Russia, and for all kinds of reasons, particularly
Speaker 1: because of anxiety about nuclear war, they're very good reasons
Speaker 1: to sort of not actually do things that would entail
Speaker 1: the US or other NATO countries of being at war
Speaker 1: with Russia. Nonetheless, obviously we've supplied Ukraine quite a bit
Speaker 1: of weapons, as you mentioned, training, etcetera. Can you help
Speaker 1: like tease apart in our minds, What is the role
Speaker 1: of the US and NATO in this war currently and
Speaker 1: what would be the type of action that would go
Speaker 1: over some line that people in the international community have
Speaker 1: about what sort of a direct involvement means, you know,
Speaker 1: those are those are those are great and and and
Speaker 1: very uh vexing questions. I think it's it's quite are
Speaker 1: to say we are fully engaged in a proxy war
Speaker 1: at this point, and I wish I hadn't seen some
Speaker 1: of the statements I have from people who I think
Speaker 1: should not be making them that goals include breaking up
Speaker 1: the Russian state, pushing Putin out of power, and even
Speaker 1: the idea that Ukraine is somehow going to get back
Speaker 1: every last inch of territory, including Crimea, which the Russians
Speaker 1: recovered in fifteen and historically was a Russian area. So
Speaker 1: I think I think the the role of diplomacy, which
Speaker 1: has really been biled in this effort. There was a
Speaker 1: bit with the Turks early on, and now some countries
Speaker 1: even like Brazil and Mexico and others, are talking about engaging.
Speaker 1: But I think there's really no place for diplomacy right
Speaker 1: now the way both sides are dug in on this
Speaker 1: but when we look at the participation of the US
Speaker 1: and NATAL and in the war, it's it's profound the
Speaker 1: Ukraine would not last, frankly, if it was not for
Speaker 1: the economic support, the military support provided by the US
Speaker 1: and by its NATO partners. The Ukrainians have been exceptionally brave,
Speaker 1: exceptionally good at fighting back against this Russian invasion. And
Speaker 1: whatever we may say about the causes of this, this
Speaker 1: was a brutal invasion that has resulted in already it's
Speaker 1: turning out hundreds of thousands of lives lost. So we
Speaker 1: do have to condemn that. What I am worried about
Speaker 1: is at the next level, what would cause this war
Speaker 1: to expand your as you point out, into something with
Speaker 1: a nuclear component, or expand into Europe, or become a
Speaker 1: full on boots on the ground war between Russia and NATO.
Speaker 1: I think there's been so much that's happened over the
Speaker 1: past year, so many changes and the way we look
Speaker 1: at this war, so many lines that have supposedly been
Speaker 1: drawn about levels of support and so on, that it's
Speaker 1: really hard to predict what would be the catalyst for
Speaker 1: this to become an expanded war. I'm very worried about
Speaker 1: things like possible use of chemical and biological weapons, or
Speaker 1: just by mistake even or hitting a nuclear power plant
Speaker 1: with shells and there's a leakage of radiation, kind of
Speaker 1: a Chernobyl scenario. And and I've been to Chernobyl, and
Speaker 1: I certainly do not want to see something like that
Speaker 1: ever again. But the Russians have basically set a few
Speaker 1: times some red lines that they have and it's it's
Speaker 1: it's almost like a dance now, it's it's or the
Speaker 1: dance of a thousand veils or a Kabuki dance, where
Speaker 1: each time another layer is removed, it's removed to the
Speaker 1: next level. Will it be armored fighting vehicles will be
Speaker 1: in main battle tanks, there will be a missiles of
Speaker 1: a certain range that can reach Russia proper, And it's
Speaker 1: hard to even define what that is. Would it be
Speaker 1: the presence of advisors and assistance on the ground, for example,
Speaker 1: and firing artillery or targeting or something like that. I
Speaker 1: personally don't think the Russians would allow this to go
Speaker 1: to that level unless they felt that their sovereignty was
Speaker 1: in danger. I think of Ukrainian troops were heading for Sevastopol,
Speaker 1: for example, then almost anything would be possible. I think
Speaker 1: of long range Ukrainian missiles hit major cities deep inside
Speaker 1: of Russia. Anything would be possible. I worry also on
Speaker 1: the other side about for example, Poland is deeply worried
Speaker 1: about this, and Poland has really been out in front
Speaker 1: in supporting the Ukrainians, both diplomatically and in terms of
Speaker 1: material support and rhetoric. But right now, for this to
Speaker 1: go to the next level, I don't think we're there yet.
Speaker 1: But I don't know how this ends. I don't know
Speaker 1: what victory looks like for either side at this point,
Speaker 1: and that's the part that I find most troubling. You
Speaker 1: mentioned the importance of oligarchs in post Soviet Russia. Can
Speaker 1: you talk to us a little bit more about what
Speaker 1: Putin's domestic support looks like at the moment, both from
Speaker 1: these sort of oligarchic slash political class and also from
Speaker 1: average people on the ground. I guess another this is
Speaker 1: my way of diplomatically asking you what we're supposed to
Speaker 1: make of all these people falling out of windows and
Speaker 1: such forth. Well, there's certainly been plenty of that, and uh,
Speaker 1: and the Russian state historically has never shied away from
Speaker 1: pushing people out of windows or impaling them or anything,
Speaker 1: depending on how far back we go in history. The oligarchs,
Speaker 1: I think, is an interesting question. The oligarchs, when when
Speaker 1: they came in and just basically ceased, They just stole everything,
Speaker 1: created this kleptocracy in Russia. They acquired a great deal
Speaker 1: of power, and Putin was really against that, and he
Speaker 1: told them he was against it, and he told them,
Speaker 1: for example, if you're a Betzovsky or you're in a
Speaker 1: Bramavitch or whatever, we're going to deal with you in
Speaker 1: a certain way. And in some cases that meant that
Speaker 1: they died. In some cases that meant that they went abroad.
Speaker 1: In some cases that meant that they lost their their holdings.
Speaker 1: We revel in watching these ridiculous yachts of Russian oligarchs
Speaker 1: being seized in Italy or along the French riviera. I mean,
Speaker 1: it's it's it's it's a great feeling to see that.
Speaker 1: But the oligarchs are really not the key here. In fact,
Speaker 1: if Putin had his way, many of the oligarchs would
Speaker 1: lose all of their money and would and would go
Speaker 1: into immigration. He doesn't like them, he doesn't bit what
Speaker 1: they stand for. Particularly if they're not one hundred percent
Speaker 1: behind his war effort. More important are these the Siloviki,
Speaker 1: these power people that he has, many of whom were
Speaker 1: ex governors, ex ministers, people who grew up with Putin
Speaker 1: and helped him along the way and supported him along
Speaker 1: the way. And I I think more about them, And frankly,
Speaker 1: the more sanctions are placed on people like that, the
Speaker 1: more they revel with it. They go to the dodga,
Speaker 1: they have a few glasses of vodka and they say, ah,
Speaker 1: I was sit with sanctions today, and they go me too,
Speaker 1: and that they actually think of that as a kind
Speaker 1: of a badge of honor in terms of support for Putin.
Speaker 1: Very very interesting dynamics here. You remember at the beginning
Speaker 1: of the war, when when when Russians were worried about
Speaker 1: being called up, and there was this exodus of young
Speaker 1: intelligent Russian people, everything from computer programmers to people from
Speaker 1: different walks of life that that didn't buy into the
Speaker 1: whole Russian status model just left. They left. They lined
Speaker 1: up at the borders, whether they wanted to Norway, whether
Speaker 1: they flew out in business class, or whether they went
Speaker 1: to Poland or Georgia, and they left and I think
Speaker 1: President Prutin said goodbye, see you later, don't come back.
Speaker 1: What's yours is ours now, And I think what we're
Speaker 1: left with there is a surprisingly hom a genious level
Speaker 1: of support for Putin in the country. Not everybody, needless
Speaker 1: to say, but your average guy in Siberia, your average
Speaker 1: guy who works in a factory, for example, is looking
Speaker 1: at this war and looking at the rhetoric on Usian
Speaker 1: social media and Russian news and starting to think maybe
Speaker 1: he was right, Maybe the West is trying to destroy us,
Speaker 1: maybe Russians are being mistreated abroad. And and I would
Speaker 1: say in this context that I find something very alarming
Speaker 1: and unnecessary in the way this war is being reported.
Speaker 1: When you listen to most of the Western press, the
Speaker 1: words that are used are fulled with contempt, derision, hatred,
Speaker 1: even rejection of culture, art, music, history, language, sports. I
Speaker 1: found myself on YouTube looking at at at a gaming
Speaker 1: show where there's a there's a new game out called
Speaker 1: Metro Exodus, which is really cool, but it's Russian, and
Speaker 1: I'm like, wow, I guess you can't. You don't really
Speaker 1: want to buy that anymore, that that would not be
Speaker 1: patriotic if you bought that I would be a little
Speaker 1: bit more worried about, you know, Swan Lake, Shaikovsky, uh
Speaker 1: Pushkin and so on. I don't think this is necessary,
Speaker 1: and I think it strengthens Putent domestically rather than weakens.
Speaker 1: And the Russians are doing enough things that are bad
Speaker 1: that the reporting doesn't have to be one animosity towards
Speaker 1: the Russian state. Every attack is not a massacre of civilians.
Speaker 1: Every allegation of a war crime is not necessarily true
Speaker 1: until it's researched correctly. And I think it's backfire is
Speaker 1: not only in the Russian population, but also I dare say,
Speaker 1: in the global South. And I spend a lot of
Speaker 1: time following social media in the global South. So I
Speaker 1: think in a roundabout way, i've i've I've come at
Speaker 1: your answer, but let me know if I have you
Speaker 1: basically took to my next question out of my mouth.
Speaker 1: Because when the invasion first happened, there were a lot
Speaker 1: of people who are pretty impressed by the Biden administration's
Speaker 1: ability to sort of corral a wide degree of global
Speaker 1: support against Russia and then effect that in the sanctions.
Speaker 1: But even at the time, you know, there were clearly
Speaker 1: big countries heavily populated countries that never really like took
Speaker 1: US side, never took a stance on the invasion, particularly
Speaker 1: across the global South. But really, you know, outside I
Speaker 1: believe of the U. S and Europe, perceptions of the
Speaker 1: war are far more scattered and less unified than they
Speaker 1: are in the US and Europe. And so I'm curious
Speaker 1: sort of like what the trajectory has been, you know,
Speaker 1: in places like India, China, Brazil, South Africa, Israel and
Speaker 1: so forth. And then I guess this sort of like
Speaker 1: a two part question. Has has the ambivalence of these
Speaker 1: countries to condemn Russia been crucial? And how helpful has
Speaker 1: that been still maintaining markets for imports and exports to
Speaker 1: prevent the sort of complete domestic collapse of the Russian economy. Yeah,
Speaker 1: this is the this is the thing I think about
Speaker 1: a great deal, and I look immediately at the bricks
Speaker 1: nations obviously, of what Russia is one of them, because
Speaker 1: all Russia, India, China, South Africa that as we speak,
Speaker 1: the Russians have been doing naval exercises with South Africa,
Speaker 1: and if we extend into Africa even further, there the
Speaker 1: Russians just uh, it's almost complete, have an agreement now
Speaker 1: with Sudan to make a naval base on the Red Sea,
Speaker 1: and Wagner Group is now in Mali where the French
Speaker 1: have left. So if we expand our our scope from
Speaker 1: the Bricks to this great global South, including especially Africa,
Speaker 1: the Middle East, parts of Asia, which I think are
Speaker 1: more concerned with the China issue right now, but even
Speaker 1: South America like Brazil and Mexico, and states obviously like
Speaker 1: Nicaragua and Bolivia and and others that have a propensity
Speaker 1: and Cuba that a propensity towards Russia. We're seeing a
Speaker 1: very mixed bag. And I find this of arming. I
Speaker 1: find it disturbing again going back to the thesis that we,
Speaker 1: regardless of what the causes were, the fault were for
Speaker 1: this war. And obviously a great deal of this is
Speaker 1: on the Russians, but certainly not all of it. What
Speaker 1: has happened in the Global South is they look at
Speaker 1: this through a different prism then the United States, Canada, Europe,
Speaker 1: the developed West. They are looking at this from a
Speaker 1: I think a prism of history in which they look
Speaker 1: kind of a scance at some of the activities of
Speaker 1: what they might have called back in the day, an
Speaker 1: imperialist nation, a colonial nation, something like that. And it
Speaker 1: never fails to alarm me when I see even on YouTube,
Speaker 1: but certainly in telegram, certainly on social media, and even
Speaker 1: in mainstream news in places like once you mentioned Joe, India, China, Brazil,
Speaker 1: South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the Emirates, Mexico, and throughout
Speaker 1: Sub Saharan Africa. You see a narrative that in some
Speaker 1: cases it is very forgiving of the Russian conduct of
Speaker 1: the war, but in other cases actually groating over each
Speaker 1: victory that the Russians have, gloating over each deployment of
Speaker 1: a new Russian web, and gloating over this ability of
Speaker 1: the Russians too counteract natal as a body. So I
Speaker 1: think we've been enormously effective in terms of the developed West,
Speaker 1: and I think less so in terms of the global South.
Speaker 1: And that leads to the second part of your question
Speaker 1: about the the economic impact. And I think this really
Speaker 1: has confounded everyone, and we we can go in at
Speaker 1: some point if you wanted to sanctions and asset for
Speaker 1: reasons at all, but we have accelerated a trend where
Speaker 1: Russia really wanted to do an Asia pivot or what
Speaker 1: I would even call a global self pivot, a pivot
Speaker 1: away from Europe, and they've been remarkably successful at it.
Speaker 1: The data is all bad. We can't trust any of
Speaker 1: the data, I think on natural gas and oil exports, commodities, diamonds,
Speaker 1: anything like that, lithium for example, a gold, silver. But
Speaker 1: it is quite clear that the natural gas is flowing
Speaker 1: in to China through power of Siberia and eventually the
Speaker 1: power of Siberia to pipeline tankers around the world. Some legally,
Speaker 1: some illegally are moving Russian crew because there's just too
Speaker 1: much money to be made on it at the prices
Speaker 1: it's being sold and resold at. And I think even
Speaker 1: in Europe you're seeing in the United States you're seeing
Speaker 1: some kind of deceptive things in terms of loyal products
Speaker 1: at all, and as to how they're moved around and
Speaker 1: what counts as Russian loyal what doesn't count as loyal
Speaker 1: that's gone through various levels of refining or processing. So
Speaker 1: I think this is exacerbated a a an economic current
Speaker 1: that the Russians kind of wanted to do anyhow, at
Speaker 1: some point. I also fear that some of the nations
Speaker 1: in the in the sort of the bricks environment, including
Speaker 1: countries that are lining up now to join bricks, like
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia, like Algeria, perhaps like Argentina and Brazil. Argentina
Speaker 1: at some point you're seeing them look for alternatives to
Speaker 1: a US dominated world economy, to a dollar dominant denominated economy,
Speaker 1: to an economy where the swift system and international banking,
Speaker 1: which is dominated by American banks is really the only
Speaker 1: way of getting two settlements where maritime insurance for tankers
Speaker 1: and containers are controlled by United States interests. And I
Speaker 1: find this disturbing because I think we need to promote
Speaker 1: our model of liberal capitalism, of global markets, of free markets,
Speaker 1: and I think the war might be having a somewhat
Speaker 1: perverse effect on that. You know, you mentioned oil and
Speaker 1: gas still flowing and emanating from Russia. Can you talk
Speaker 1: to us a little bit more about the role of
Speaker 1: those commodities in this conflict, or how different do you
Speaker 1: think this would have been if Russia wasn't a major
Speaker 1: world supplier of natural gas. I think right now Russia
Speaker 1: is still and has been for a long time, you know,
Speaker 1: largely reliant on its hydrocarbonate exports, and also it's it's
Speaker 1: it's raw materials and mineral exports and such. Obviously they
Speaker 1: export a variety of things, but I think they rely
Speaker 1: very heavily on this. I think when the Europeans and
Speaker 1: and did this quite brilliantly. I watched how quickly the
Speaker 1: Germans put an L n G terminal in, for example,
Speaker 1: in the Baltic and record time they built a terminal
Speaker 1: to bring imports from the US. But when I think
Speaker 1: when when the Russians started to lose a great deal
Speaker 1: of this, especially the natural gas side into Europe, I
Speaker 1: think this hurt them. I think it hurt them considerably.
Speaker 1: I think they had considered this as a possibility, uh
Speaker 1: the old lords dream Nords dream too, is as a
Speaker 1: whole mother can of worms that could be talked about.
Speaker 1: But I think they had already started to set up
Speaker 1: alternatives in terms of the numerous pipelines that go into Europe,
Speaker 1: go into the Middle East. They're talking going across Iran
Speaker 1: now for example, and go into China. So I think
Speaker 1: they were able to recover a lot of that, and
Speaker 1: that is the fuel that keeps their military industry going,
Speaker 1: That is the fuel that keeps them able to fuel
Speaker 1: literally fuel that keeps them able to feed their people,
Speaker 1: for example, and I think they've done much better than
Speaker 1: we thought they did, but I think the sanctions have
Speaker 1: caused some very big systemic problems for them, whether it's
Speaker 1: in the aviation industry and the high tech industry and
Speaker 1: access to certain types of products and services. You know,
Speaker 1: it's funny. You can you can watch on YouTube Russians
Speaker 1: going to supermarkets and you don't know if these are
Speaker 1: Potemkin villages that are selected for that reason. I suspect
Speaker 1: they are not. But the stories are full, the shelves
Speaker 1: are full, and maybe the product mixes a little different.
Speaker 1: Maybe they're complaining that the box the cardboard boxes are
Speaker 1: painted white instead of multicolor because of the lack of dyes.
Speaker 1: But you see, you see food from Turkey, from Iran,
Speaker 1: from Asia of Russian production. Russia is a bread basket
Speaker 1: and always has been, so I think they're doing reasonably
Speaker 1: well on that. But the pain is certainly happening, and
Speaker 1: over time it's really difficult to predict how bad the
Speaker 1: pain will be with inside of Russia. And I think
Speaker 1: this is part of the gamble that that we're taking
Speaker 1: right now. Talk about that a little bit further. I mean,
Speaker 1: I'm I'm still curious, you know, going back to one
Speaker 1: of your first answers about the domestic support, and you
Speaker 1: know you mentioned a lot of sort of young talented
Speaker 1: people sort of got on got on the next flight
Speaker 1: as soon as this war started. But obviously, you know
Speaker 1: there's still a large middle class or the Russian middle class,
Speaker 1: like in the major cities around Moscow, etcetera. How has
Speaker 1: the sanctions are just the economic effects or the war
Speaker 1: sort of affect date their day to day life so
Speaker 1: best as you can tell, And what are the risks
Speaker 1: to putin if this sort of ongoing degradation of sort
Speaker 1: normal life continues and continues to worsen, because again, wars
Speaker 1: are extremely costly for obvious reasons. Yeah, I think that.
Speaker 1: I think at certain levels Russians, uh certainly are are suffering.
Speaker 1: When you look at the major cities like St. Petersburg
Speaker 1: and Moscow, I think it goes much further than your
Speaker 1: inability to get a Gucci bag, for example, or to
Speaker 1: have a Marks and Spencer. I think there are systemic
Speaker 1: things that are happening. I think the inflation is is
Speaker 1: not not too terrible. I think the product mixes not
Speaker 1: too terrible. I think people would like to have better
Speaker 1: access to cars. They'd like to be sure that the
Speaker 1: aircraft are going to fly on are safe and are
Speaker 1: being maintained. But you know, Russians historically are are used
Speaker 1: to a bit of pain. I think of this is
Speaker 1: a different era, of course, this is a different global
Speaker 1: error where people can see on social media how others live.
Speaker 1: But this is a country that lives through the nine
Speaker 1: hundred days of Lennon Grad. This is a country that
Speaker 1: lived through Napoleon actually taking and burning Moscow. This is
Speaker 1: a tree that lost heaven knows how many twenty million,
Speaker 1: forty million, some due to their own murderous regime in
Speaker 1: World War two. So I think there is ability to
Speaker 1: endure a lot of this. And one of the things
Speaker 1: Putin is doing is he is paying the soldiers more.
Speaker 1: He's bringing contract soldiers aboard. He's paying death benefits that
Speaker 1: may seem very little to us, but are actually enough
Speaker 1: to feed a family for a couple of years sometimes
Speaker 1: for people who are are are killed in the war.
Speaker 1: And there are many of those, and there are many
Speaker 1: people that are very angry about this. The mothers of
Speaker 1: of of the victims of the war but you know
Speaker 1: it's funny. I was watching on YouTube a while back.
Speaker 1: There's a charming series about Yakutia, the coldest place on earth,
Speaker 1: with the temperatures at minus seventy, and they show the
Speaker 1: Yakutsu Russians. They all speak Russian and they're out there
Speaker 1: in minus seventy just trying to get to the bathroom
Speaker 1: without freezing to death, or get to the rivers. They
Speaker 1: can drill a hole and get some fish out without
Speaker 1: freezing to death. And I laughed at one point one
Speaker 1: of our officials that there the Russians aren't winter east
Speaker 1: for the war, and I said, oh my god, there
Speaker 1: are yakut mortar crews right now that the Russians are
Speaker 1: showing on their social media in action. And for them
Speaker 1: this is like, wow, it's pretty warm here, this is
Speaker 1: pretty good weather here. We maybe we should stay here
Speaker 1: rather than going back to Yakutya, except that they love it.
Speaker 1: So yes, there is suffering, but on another level, the
Speaker 1: suffering is understood and it's a part of the Russian condition.
Speaker 1: And what we have to do is find that balance
Speaker 1: between the economic suffering that would cause something to happen
Speaker 1: there or derail the Russian war. Machine, but not to
Speaker 1: cause such suffering that the people who listen to the
Speaker 1: Russian propaganda and this is an information war, say again
Speaker 1: he was right. They really are trying to break us
Speaker 1: up as a country. Why would they want to destroy
Speaker 1: my ability in Central Asia or in Eastern Siberia or
Speaker 1: in ar Kanels to eat and to get electricity and
Speaker 1: warmth and the things that we're used to in life.
Speaker 1: And I think we have to be very careful about
Speaker 1: this because this plays into, I think a Russian way
Speaker 1: of thinking about life that has existed for centuries. You know,
Speaker 1: I realized when I was doing your intro and summarizing
Speaker 1: your career, I couldn't include everything. And there's one important
Speaker 1: thing I left out, which was that you were a
Speaker 1: director of the Center for Cyber Intelligence at the CIA,
Speaker 1: and so we have to ask you. We would be
Speaker 1: remiss not to ask you what your take is on
Speaker 1: the cyber component of this particular conflict, because of course
Speaker 1: we have had, you know, various things that have happened
Speaker 1: over the past twelve months, certain explosions and things shutting down,
Speaker 1: but it's never exactly clear whether or not there is
Speaker 1: a cyber component behind them. Yeah, I'm I'm actually a
Speaker 1: bit surprised at the minimal level of cyber activity we've
Speaker 1: seen from the Russian side. Now, there's no doubt, and
Speaker 1: they've been doing it for many years. They're doing reconnaissance
Speaker 1: in our infrastructure, our electrical utilities are nuclear power plants
Speaker 1: and so on, and needless to say, doing everything they
Speaker 1: can to survey defense industry and government institutions. But no,
Speaker 1: there has not been, for example, a attack on April
Speaker 1: fourteen on the I R s imagine shutting down the
Speaker 1: United States. There has not been an Internet of Things
Speaker 1: attack on the air conditioning systems at the Pentagon Saturday night,
Speaker 1: at midnight in August we've seen. I think you might
Speaker 1: be giving them ideas. Now I don't think I have
Speaker 1: to give them any ideas that these are, but I
Speaker 1: will stop using examples in that case. They're they're The
Speaker 1: Russians have always used patriotic actor hackers of fellow travelers
Speaker 1: and such. Sometimes it's done directly from Russian intelligence. Sometimes
Speaker 1: it's gone through proxies and cutouts and contractors. And again
Speaker 1: this this small army of patriotic hackers, some of whom
Speaker 1: have left the country to go make money doing cyber
Speaker 1: work and information work outside of Russian and places where
Speaker 1: they can earn a living. There was actually a report
Speaker 1: in social and Russian social media last night that a
Speaker 1: cyber attack had begun by these fellow travelers. I haven't
Speaker 1: seen any indication of that yet. I think this is
Speaker 1: very alarming to both sides. There are things that could
Speaker 1: be done to the backbone of the Internet. People think
Speaker 1: of the Internet as being in the ether somehow, when
Speaker 1: it's actually largely dependent on fiber cables and it's kind
Speaker 1: of back and forth between the Russians and the Americans
Speaker 1: has been going on for a long time on this.
Speaker 1: I would really fear that if things get really bad
Speaker 1: for the Russians or they see this as a means
Speaker 1: of stopping arms from getting to Ukraine, that they would
Speaker 1: do such an attack, then there would be a retaliation.
Speaker 1: And the US has become infinitely more capable over time
Speaker 1: and made even places like Estonia, for example, our our
Speaker 1: leaders in this area. I would worry about that, and
Speaker 1: it's really mostly been at the tactical levels, and when
Speaker 1: we talk about cyber of course we can't help but
Speaker 1: mention Elon Musk. Elon Musk, who with Starlink was actually
Speaker 1: one of the saviors of Ukraine early in the war,
Speaker 1: and now he's having second thoughts about the use of
Speaker 1: starlink for drone operations, for offensive drone operations again with
Speaker 1: the fear that perhaps this will escalate the war. So
Speaker 1: I think there's a lot of things we don't know yet.
Speaker 1: I think there's a lot of very serious preparations going
Speaker 1: on on both sides. But I'm just surprised we haven't
Speaker 1: seen more yet. We've talked a lot, obviously out the
Speaker 1: effect that this war has had on Russian citizens, the
Speaker 1: support for Putin among those who are in Russia. We
Speaker 1: haven't talked about the equivalent in Ukraine. Ukrainians have obviously,
Speaker 1: you know, seeing their economy wrecked, They're experiencing power outages,
Speaker 1: all kinds of devastations, famined obviously the incur incursion on
Speaker 1: their sovereignty. What is the effect that this is having
Speaker 1: in terms of support for Zelensky and the domestic political
Speaker 1: trajectory in Ukraine, Because we talked about the West and Russia,
Speaker 1: but can't leave out like the you know, the the
Speaker 1: key other central actor here. Yeah, I think again we
Speaker 1: have we have to go back to the original thesis
Speaker 1: that It is absolutely amazing and heartening that the the
Speaker 1: level of resolve of the Ukrainian people, they've suffered catastrophic
Speaker 1: personnel losses, that the two numbers of which are we
Speaker 1: may never know, but are coming out and are are
Speaker 1: much larger than than we we thought they were. We've
Speaker 1: seen exactly the kind of economic destruction that you've talked
Speaker 1: about where the Russians they are engaged in economic warfare.
Speaker 1: They are engaged in a classic type of economic warfare
Speaker 1: that I would call old school that has always been
Speaker 1: done in war, which is destroying infrastructure which is of
Speaker 1: military value, electrical transmission, the ability of trains to bring
Speaker 1: troops and equipment to the front, and so on. Economic
Speaker 1: warfare is nothing new. Take of the Union blockades of
Speaker 1: the South and the Civil war, understricted submarine warfare in
Speaker 1: World War One, even strategic bombing in World War Two
Speaker 1: where we try to take out all the German factories.
Speaker 1: But you're right, this has a huge impact on the
Speaker 1: Ukrainian economy and eventually it becomes a question of persistence. Now,
Speaker 1: bearing in mind that a number of Ukrainians millions have left,
Speaker 1: some will not come back, some are now in Poland.
Speaker 1: If it. There's about a million and a half there
Speaker 1: now in Germany and in other parts of the world.
Speaker 1: Some have come back when they saw that the war
Speaker 1: was angle a little better than they thought it would,
Speaker 1: and they saw the bravery of the Ukrainian leadership and
Speaker 1: the Ukrainian army. But eventually you reach a point where
Speaker 1: the economy is moribund, but there is no economy. It
Speaker 1: becomes a state completely dependent on the West, on financial support,
Speaker 1: on donations, not even to think about the eventual reconstruction period.
Speaker 1: And I think one of the smartest things President Zelensky
Speaker 1: said was he made it very clear to Black Rock
Speaker 1: and Goldman, Sachs and City Group and so on. He goes,
Speaker 1: you are very welcome here. You will make money here
Speaker 1: in the reconstruction period. And that's certainly a good argument
Speaker 1: for continued support, because at the end of the day,
Speaker 1: war comes down to money as well as power and
Speaker 1: geopolitical issues. I think the issue of domestic support for
Speaker 1: Zolenski is fastening. Zolensky is a rock star in the
Speaker 1: West Okay. He can appear in really almost any format,
Speaker 1: and he is welcomed. He has his he has his brand,
Speaker 1: his way of dressing, his way of speaking, and he's
Speaker 1: quite good at it, and I think he's been very
Speaker 1: effective in the Westmond That very interesting. What's happening though
Speaker 1: back in Kiev? Now, well, first we lost they lost
Speaker 1: a helicopter with the entire Interior Ministry leadership on it,
Speaker 1: which I think was a painful accident. But in the
Speaker 1: same time frame, you saw quite a number of senior
Speaker 1: officials being fired, being forced to resign, and I mean dozens,
Speaker 1: and this includes you know, you're the Defense Minister, d Estovich,
Speaker 1: who is his his primary advisor, a number of governors,
Speaker 1: a number of senior officials in different areas, and now
Speaker 1: you have the head of the Ukrainian Intelligence Service is
Speaker 1: going to take over the Defense ministry. And you've seen
Speaker 1: the mayor of Kiev sort of clash with President Zelenski
Speaker 1: over the approach to the war and who's doing enough
Speaker 1: and who's not doing enough. So it's very interesting to
Speaker 1: watch the Russian reaction to these figures too, and the
Speaker 1: Russians are are again it's a propaganda war and their
Speaker 1: terror a lot of what they say, they call Zalenski
Speaker 1: the clown, that's their name for him. They have a
Speaker 1: number of epithets that they use. They don't say this
Speaker 1: about Lusoni, the head of the General staff. They say
Speaker 1: this is a final officer who we respect and who
Speaker 1: has really given us a body knows. So my question
Speaker 1: is where is President Zelenski right now? We know where
Speaker 1: he is in terms of the west. Of that, there
Speaker 1: can be a little question at home. I think he's
Speaker 1: still doing enormously well because he is the face of
Speaker 1: the war. But I think in a country where we
Speaker 1: have to admit there is a deep level of corruption,
Speaker 1: and like in any political system, there is in fighting,
Speaker 1: there is a desire for power, there are resentments, there
Speaker 1: are jealousies. We've seen a number of changes recently that
Speaker 1: lead us to question where is this going in terms
Speaker 1: of domestic politics, and what would the Russians do to
Speaker 1: try to exacerbate this or take advantage of it. I
Speaker 1: just have one more question, and it's, you know, one
Speaker 1: of those things trying to sum up the whole conversation.
Speaker 1: But what's been the most surprising to you about the
Speaker 1: past twelve months. I think the difficulty of predictions again
Speaker 1: and I started with that and I'll end with that
Speaker 1: has has really confounded most observers in this from whether
Speaker 1: the war would happen to how quickly it would be resolved.
Speaker 1: And we're at a point now where we may be
Speaker 1: looking like we're pretty Goes from the Wagner Group says, well,
Speaker 1: it might take us two years to recover the rest
Speaker 1: of the dun Bas. I think what surprised me, and
Speaker 1: I think what surprised a lot of observers is we
Speaker 1: watched as this war began, and we saw that the
Speaker 1: Javelin missiles and the Stinger missiles, and the intelligence support
Speaker 1: and law and now we're seeing that this is all
Speaker 1: terribly important, the drone war, the aerial war, the intelligence war.
Speaker 1: But we're seeing World War One type trench systems. We're
Speaker 1: seeing the Russians bring out artillery pieces literally from World
Speaker 1: War Two and just bombarding the front continuously, continuously, continuously
Speaker 1: to try to break down the Ukrainian resistance. And I
Speaker 1: think this new plan of bringing in tanks, you know,
Speaker 1: whether it's American Abrams tanks or Challengers or Leopard twos
Speaker 1: or less effectively, Leopard ones, I think this will make
Speaker 1: a difference. But we're seeing a kind of war that
Speaker 1: I think people thought had somehow gone away in World
Speaker 1: War Two and we're seeing it back and this is
Speaker 1: the Russian way of war. And when you see the
Speaker 1: Russian Chief of the General Staff got Auso, now taking
Speaker 1: charge of the war, you see that they're looking at
Speaker 1: this in a different way, and this has become a
Speaker 1: slug fest. So I think that surprised me. Another thing
Speaker 1: I think that that surprises and and and confounds me
Speaker 1: again is on the information warfare. I think we're all
Speaker 1: sides of kind of painted themselves into a corner that
Speaker 1: they can't emerge from anymore. The United States can't walk
Speaker 1: away from this, not after Afghanistan, not with the very
Speaker 1: real need to defend the Ukrainians against a Russian invasion,
Speaker 1: and the Russians can't walk away from areas that they
Speaker 1: have formally annexed, whether or not this has been recognized
Speaker 1: by the world. And I think that's the most confounding
Speaker 1: part of this, in that the rhetoric of the information
Speaker 1: warfare and also the level of the economic warfare here
Speaker 1: has made it that I don't see anything in the
Speaker 1: short term that will allow this to resolve itself. And
Speaker 1: I fear you knows, as you and Joe said at
Speaker 1: the beginning, that we may end up in kind of
Speaker 1: a demilitarized zone um with conditions of ceasefire and peace.
Speaker 1: But I don't think anyone can predict it. So that
Speaker 1: is what has confounded me, and also just the inability
Speaker 1: of anyone to correctly determine what would happen in this war.
Speaker 1: Predictions are just so hard to make, all right, Robert
Speaker 1: pap really the perfect odd lots of guests, Thank you
Speaker 1: so much for coming on. We're gonna have to have
Speaker 1: you back to talk about the history of the Russian
Speaker 1: stock market. Just do an episode on if any of
Speaker 1: your investment audience want to revive their investments in nineteenth
Speaker 1: century securities. I've indexed these and given total return models
Speaker 1: for them, and sadly, just just just as an opening,
Speaker 1: as a final comment, I would say what I found
Speaker 1: in that period after all that work was you really
Speaker 1: did well with blue chips. Nothing ever changes, nothing ever changed.
Speaker 1: So that was that conclusion. And thank you guys so
Speaker 1: much for having me. It's been a lot of fun.
Speaker 1: Thank you, Thanks Robert. That was great. So Joe, I
Speaker 1: thought that was a fantastic summary of the past twelve
Speaker 1: months or so. And to Robert's point, it is kind
Speaker 1: of crazy when you think back to February of two
Speaker 1: and what people were expecting in terms of a military conflict, Like, yes,
Speaker 1: we have had drones, there are some very very advanced
Speaker 1: missiles being used and things like that. But on the
Speaker 1: other hand, you know, we're talking about Russian tanks from
Speaker 1: World War one world War two rolling across the border.
Speaker 1: And you know, even I'm thinking back to that episode
Speaker 1: we did on wooden paletts, like the shortage of Russian
Speaker 1: wooden pallets, it all seems very very old school in
Speaker 1: terms of military technology. Yeah, you know, I think to
Speaker 1: Robert's point about, you know, the let the inability of
Speaker 1: people who try to predict these things to get anything
Speaker 1: right has been really striking. And I do think, you know,
Speaker 1: if you go back to last February Prime, most people
Speaker 1: in their minds would have expected something maybe more akin
Speaker 1: to the invasion of Crimea, which for the Russian was
Speaker 1: kind of a cake walk. They walked in and they
Speaker 1: took it, and probably putin roughly thought the same thing,
Speaker 1: maybe it would be a little tough for and that
Speaker 1: explains the sort of very poorly thought out state of
Speaker 1: the invasion, the allowed invasion that proved to be very costly.
Speaker 1: The different terms in this and then yes, the fact
Speaker 1: that now a year later and we talk a lot
Speaker 1: about these advanced weapons systems, but it's just this grind,
Speaker 1: this trench warfare, horrible human losses persisting, and then this
Speaker 1: question of like, okay, how long can either side take
Speaker 1: It is absolutely just the sort of horrible state of
Speaker 1: affairs going on right now. Well, the other thing that
Speaker 1: I was thinking about and Robert spoke about was this
Speaker 1: idea of the entrenching of positions and the fact that
Speaker 1: people are you know, they seem to come up with
Speaker 1: rigid demands that don't really allow for some sort of
Speaker 1: compromise I mean, for obvious reasons on on certain sides.
Speaker 1: But then what that tends to lead to, and this
Speaker 1: kind of gets into his information warfare point as well,
Speaker 1: is that you just got these hardenings of alliances and
Speaker 1: of feelings. And I don't think that in the West
Speaker 1: we are necessarily seeing the extent of that in other
Speaker 1: places in the world, Yeah, No, I mean, I do
Speaker 1: think that the reactions to this war outside of US
Speaker 1: and Europe have sort of been undercovered, and we're probably
Speaker 1: explanatory about the degree to which the Russian economy continued
Speaker 1: to operate. But to this point about the hardening positions,
Speaker 1: it does make you wonder whether that's sort of dotted
Speaker 1: line war forever outcome is where it's going, because if
Speaker 1: none of the sides can, if there's nothing on paper
Speaker 1: that any side can theoretically except except right, so then
Speaker 1: you have to sort of find some outcome that is
Speaker 1: like de facto acceptance but never stated publicly, and so
Speaker 1: you know, hopefully that is something more peaceful than we
Speaker 1: have right now. But again it's hard to see, like, Okay,
Speaker 1: what is that ultimate of ramp look like? Yeah, all right,
Speaker 1: on that pessimistic note, shall we leave it there? Let's
Speaker 1: leave it there? Okay. This has been another episode of
Speaker 1: the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow
Speaker 1: me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wi
Speaker 1: Isn't All. You can follow me on Twitter at the
Speaker 1: Stalwart and for more of our special coverage on one
Speaker 1: year of Russia's war in Ukraine, send up for the
Speaker 1: Balance of Power newsletter that's at bloomberg dot com slash Newsletters. Meanwhile,
Speaker 1: follow our producers Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand and Dash
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Speaker 1: go to bloomberg dot com slash outlets. Thanks for listening.
Speaker 1: The Year to E